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
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Articles

The Kyoto Conference, 1954

By N. D. Harper.

I

The Twelfth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations met at Kyoto from September 29 to October 8, 1954. Kyoto was an appropriate meeting place for the conference. The political capital of Japan for over a thousand years, it is also the cultural centre of Japan. With its imperial palaces and the castles of the shoguns it typifies the struggle for power in medieval and early modern Japan. Its 1,400 temples and shrines are a reminder of the rich religious heritage of Japan. Here the No plays developed with their fragile and stylised beauty. The Kabuki drama — the popular theatre of Japan — was born here. The ancient handicrafts and textile industries of Japan live cheek by jowl with the modern Western factories. The magnificent gardens and quiet tea houses symbolise the heart of Japanese culture. The universities and colleges demonstrate the marriage between the old and the new. The great industrial centres so close to Kyoto and the carefully tended countryside illustrate the balance which has developed between Western techniques and Eastern traditions.

Almost 25 years have elapsed since the Second Conference of the newly formed Institute of Pacific Relations met in Kyoto. During this quarter of a century the Pacific area has changed greatly. This was reflected in part in the composition of the conference. New Asian nations like India and Pakistan were fully represented as important and independent states. Indonesia sat at such a conference for the first time. Japan, with her Institute of International Affairs reorganised and revitalised, was the host at her first postwar conference. The United Kingdom and the United States, Canada and Australia represented the older Western interests in the area. France played but a minor part: her interests in the area are steadily contracting. The Philippines took her seat as another new independent state. It was significant that the Burma Council of World Affairs sought affiliation, and that at the next conference perhaps Ceylon, Laos and Cambodia as well as Burma may well be represented. The notable absentees were the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Their absence spoke eloquently of the difficulties of international co-operation and reflected the difficult problem of associating state-controlled or state-sponsored research bodies with privately controlled research institutes. One of the cardinal principles underlying such conferences has been that the

members represented should in no way be tied to Governments. The changing political structure of Asian and Western states may well necessitate the working out of a new formula to broaden the basis of representation and at the same time retain the essential quality of the conferences themselves and of the research work which forms the chief *raison d'être* of the affiliated members of the Pacific Council.

The basic shifts in the Pacific area since the earlier Kyoto conference were reflected also in the central problem to be discussed at the 1954 conference. The provisional agenda had placed the Cold War in the Pacific as the first major theme to be discussed. This was felt, particularly by the Asian members, to represent a Western rather than an Asian approach to Pacific problems. Accordingly, it was relegated to the latter part of the agenda as one of the external factors affecting broad economic problems. The central theme became "Economic Development and Standards of Living in Asia." The first stage of the discussions was accordingly centred upon a descriptive analysis of the internal situation in Asia: Japan and China, South-East Asia and South Asia. This would provide a firm basis for the major work of the conference. One inevitable consequence of the somewhat belated shift in emphasis was that many of the data-papers submitted to the conference became less relevant. They were geared to a different kind of agenda in which external political and economic factors were of more moment. On the other hand, this gave a greater importance to the role of the economic experts, less to the experts in other fields who formed a considerable part of national delegations. It did, however, minimise the possibilities of an early clash on political issues, a clash which could be less serious when delegations had come to know one another better and to have a fuller appreciation of the viewpoints and problems of the other countries represented.

The smooth and efficient functioning of the conference was a tribute alike to the preliminary preparations of the international secretariat and the care and skill of the Japanese hosts. A balance was struck between intensive round-table discussions and the less formal individual discussions between members. Generous hospitality afforded opportunities for individual delegates to secure a more intimate knowledge of Japanese life and culture, to obtain at first-hand some insight into Japan's economic problems. The size of the conference — over 100 delegates and observers — meant that if effective discussion were to take place, the number of round-tables would have to be increased. This meant a certain duplication of work, evident as rapporteurs presented summaries of discussions to plenary conference. This was offset by the fact that with a tightly packed agenda it was inevitable that parallel round-tables tended to concentrate their work on different aspects of the agenda. The concentration of interest was reflected in the setting up of two round-tables at each stage to consider the problems primarily of Japan. China was grouped for convenience

with Japan, but there were few China experts present. Delegates from other Asian countries with lower standards of living than Japan, conscious of the wide economic gulf separating Japan from the rest of Asia, were even more interested than Western observers in the achievements of Japan and in the shifts in official policy since 1945.

II

Geographically and economically, Japan occupies a key position in Asia. Of all Asian countries she has had the greatest experience in industrialisation and capital development; her agriculture is the most efficient in the region and provides a partial object lesson in skills and techniques, partial because of the special problems of a confined island economy. Japan has had the longest experience in the adaptation of new Western techniques of production and management to an Eastern economy with a different social basis. Over a period of three-quarters of a century Japan has adapted, with varying success, Western political institutions, and for the past decade, strenuous efforts have been made to transplant the forms of Western democracy at the same time as economic changes have been introduced to give these forms a sound social basis. To most Asian countries, despite differences in climate and resources and social systems, Japan epitomises their problems: the utilisation of resources to develop a balanced economy and to raise living standards, the conditions under which democracy can function successfully.

Of most immediate interest was the question of the trend in Japanese politics, the nature of the "reverse course." SCAP policy from 1945 was conceived with two rather conflicting concepts in mind: the Jeffersonian tradition of laissez-faire with the minimising of government action, and the New Deal concept of the welfare state with a considerable enlargement of the area of state activity. The whole programme of converting a nationalist-militarist state into a democratic state was an extraordinary difficult one, estimated to take a generation to accomplish. Basic changes in every aspect of Japanese life had been introduced as the plan gained impetus; yet before five years had elapsed, drastic modifications had been effected in the democratic postwar politics.

The "reverse course"—the realignment of Japanese national life—began in the summer of 1948 with the development of the Cold War. The initial impetus came from the reversal of SCAP policy and America's determination to convert Japan into a "workshop of East Asia" and a Far Eastern bastion against Communism. The revival of Japanese political parties under the new democratic impulse and the gradual recovery of the Japanese economy led to increasing pressure to re-examine the

reforms in the light of Japanese tradition and experience. The signature of the Peace Treaty in 1951 and the gradual recovery of national sovereignty accelerated the process.

The "reverse course" manifested itself in a variety of ways. The hardening attitude to labour was seen in the revision of the National Public Service Law in July, 1948, which limited the right of striking and prohibited political strikes. Civil servants—especially teachers and railway employees—were debarred from direct action. A Diet law prevented teachers in primary schools from engaging in political activities. Intensive propaganda was undertaken against Communism and an attempt was made to break Left-wing trade-unions. In December, 1947, the Katayama Government decentralised the police system, previously concentrated in the hands of the Home Ministry. The national police were decentralised among autonomous local communities and a National Public Safety Commission established to supersede the Home Ministry in the supervision of the police system. In February 1953, Premier Yoshida attempted formally to emasculate the National Public Safety Commission and abolish local control over the police. The attempt failed but in fact most local authorities had already surrendered control over police as a result of popular vote. The revival of police power, partly as a response to the growing fear of Communism, was seen in the increasing censorship of mails, the checking of private libraries and the screening of teachers from the primary school to the University level. While the conference was sitting, the creation of a new Central Survey Agency in Tokyo aroused apprehension amongst Japanese journalists. The major papers — *Asahi* and *Mainichi* — were not represented on an agency which resembled the old Board of Information.

Japanese data-papers to the conference drew attention to the pervasive influence of the old bureaucracy.¹ This had provided the essential framework of the old administrative system and had inevitably been one of major instruments for the conduct of the Pacific War. The local Autonomy Law of May 1947, had aimed at the abolition of the Home Ministry and the decentralisation of power among the local authorities. In fact decentralisation had failed and local budgets were still dependent upon central government finance. The remarkable tenacity of the old bureaucracy was due to the dependence of the occupation authorities upon the bureaucrats to implement SCAP policy; to the traditional, perhaps misplaced faith in the political neutrality of the bureaucracy; to the lack of knowledge and administrative experience by the new political leaders who had to lean heavily on the bureaucrats.

These were some of the main manifestations of the new trend in Japanese politics. This reorientation was seen, too, in the growing attacks upon the newly won status of woman, in the revival of the prewar national

1. K. Tsuji: *Japanese Government in Post War Transition* (Japan Paper No. 7.); J. Kyogoku and J. Masumi: *Japanese Politics; is it Democratised?* (Japan Paper, No. 10.)

songs and patriotic societies. The new land reforms were under increasing criticism and the Zaibatsu appeared to be re-emerging in a new form, despite the earlier attempts to break their pervasive influence.

How could the "reverse course" be interpreted? What were its implications? On the surface of it, many of the changes were primarily political in character, part of the anti-Yoshida campaign. But they went much deeper than this. The whole policy of democratisation had been imposed from outside, often with little real grasp of the basic psychology of the Japanese people. The upsurge of patriotic feeling was in part a reaction against foreign occupation, its institutions, ideas and customs, rather than a revolt against democratic influences. The Japanese people, now that independence had been again achieved, wanted to re-examine the new institutions to see how far these were suited to Japanese conditions, what adaptations were necessary to make them an integral part of Japanese structure and tradition. To some Japanese, democracy appeared to be an alien philosophy imposed by force. This view ignored the earlier Japanese experience with democratic government in the 'twenties. It is clear, however, that democracy in Japan has relatively shallow roots and that the growing pains of the postwar period have induced some scepticism about its value. The conflict tends to be one largely between the older and the younger generations, with youth revolting against the old family discipline, demanding independence and responsibility, supporting democratic social and political institutions. The older generation, more dubious about democracy and more firmly wedded to tradition, leaned towards a "reverse course."

One possible interpretation of the "reverse course" is that it represented the first major step in a return to totalitarianism and militarism. This view was strengthened by the decline both in numerical strength and power of the trade-union movement, by the re-emergence of conservative political leaders and the external evidences of a revival of police power and perhaps even the reinstitution of thought control. Yet it is significant that there is no political party based on a platform of a reverse course involving a return to the prewar status quo. Much of the current criticism of democracy is designed to remove obstacles to its successful functioning, to secure a firmer understanding of its rather imperfectly grasped principles. In the zigs and zags of changing policy, it is essential to determine the trend of movement. In looking at the stream it is important to distinguish between the surface eddies and the direction of the main current. At present, this appears to be quite clearly away from totalitarianism. Whether this will continue will depend on two possible developments. Extensive rearmament could bring with it the revival of the old military clique: but the constitution debars ranking military leaders from office and denies to them the old direct access to the Emperor. A serious economic recession, with extensive unemployment following a failure

to open new overseas markets, could produce the classic historical combination of extreme right and extreme left with a return of a militarist-nationalist clique and the destruction of democracy. These are the immediate short-term dangers that could change the surface eddies of the "reverse course" into a permanently anti-democratic direction.

III

Underlying the discussion of political problems — and this discussion was confined chiefly to Japan — was the assumption that there is the closest possible relationship between political stability and improving economic conditions. There was at no stage a full discussion of the problem of Communist penetration in Asia: this was perhaps an intangible background factor in the minds of most delegates at a conference of democratic countries. It was realised that political progress could not take place in an unfavourable economic environment; if the living standards deteriorated or remained static in Asia, if unemployment became widespread, then democratic institutions could become the first casualty. In writing the Japanese Constitution, the framers had kept in mind the basic Jeffersonian concept of the relationship between democracy and the diffusion of property ownership. The survival of parliamentary government in India and Pakistan is dependent in the last analysis upon the capacity of their Governments to deal with the Himalayan problems of poverty and to raise real incomes. This was really the central problem of the conference.

A cardinal aspect of the effective use of basic resources to raise living standards is the question of rapid increase of population. In India and Pakistan population has increased from 389 million in 1941 to 454 million in 1954. The first reliable estimates of China's population give a figure of 580 million at the recent census; projections based upon the present rate of increase estimate it as 800 million in 1967.² Ayanori Okazaki's analysis of trends in Japanese population² showed that the 72 million of 1940 had risen to 83 million in 1950: of this increase 5 million represented net immigration as a result of the return of troops overseas. Given a reduction in birth rate to the Swedish level, population would reach 107 million by 1990. The primary cause of the rapid increase in numbers in Japan, as in other Asian countries, is that the death-rate in recent years has fallen more rapidly than the birth-rate. This was the condition of European countries during the nineteenth century. Japanese real income per head had increased steadily until 1937, largely through the skilful utilisation of agricultural resources which doubled the annual output of rice, and through the expansion of external trade which gave access to foreign supplies of raw materials and food on favourable terms. The loss of her colonies and of her special position in Manchuria

2. A. Okazaki: *The Present and Future of Japan's population* (Japan Paper No. 4.)

had brought a catastrophic change. With her export trade dwindling to one-third of its previous volume, Japan was faced with a net annual addition to her population of between 750,000 and 1,000,000. "With contracted markets and diminished economic power, Japan seemed to be moving inevitably towards impoverishment and unemployment."³

China and India face a similar problem of population increase, but their area and potential internal resources are incomparably greater than those of Japan. All three countries realise that emigration can provide no real relief. Japan is inaugurating a programme of emigration to Brazil. But the number of ships available, or being converted for emigration, is too small to make any appreciable difference. India is gradually introducing a programme of birth-control, but its impact will be very gradual and can have no serious influence on population increase for perhaps twenty years. In Japan, a reversal of policy has taken place. Before the war, a high birth-rate was encouraged in the interests of national power. To-day, the Birth Control Commission is carrying out an active radio propaganda and is advertising a diffusion of knowledge of birth-control methods by doctors and social workers. The number of abortions has increased sharply and the birth-rate has declined appreciably. But it is proving difficult to make any serious impact in a short space of time. "The rural population, which had the largest families, were resistant to propaganda, especially as the farmers were still influenced by the idea that more children would mean more help on the farm at harvest. The absence of privacy in the Japanese house, and the circumstances of domestic life, also had an inhibiting effect. Moreover, the cost of the appliances was very expensive for the poorer members of the population."⁴ The immediate problem still remains that of how the economy can sustain a substantial increase until perhaps the pressure is eased within a generation. Post-war children will continue to come into the labour market for another fifteen years.

The solution to this Asian problem lies partly in the capacity of agriculture to increase per capita productivity, partly in development of efficient and competitive industries, partly in the expansion of international trade. To observers from India and Pakistan, geography has made Japan's agricultural experience partly irrelevant. On the other hand, the remarkable efficiency of Japanese agriculture does afford some lessons. Increased output has been the result of widespread agricultural education, the ample use of fertilisers, and the introduction of superior types of seed. Yet Japanese agriculture has apparently reached the limits of expansion within the existing economy. Eighteen million people are to-day living on the same area of cultivable land as fourteen million in 1939. Land reform has not always contributed to increased productivity, and high rice prices have encouraged under-

3. Rapporteur's report: Topic B. Round Table 1.

4. *Ibid.*

employment in rural areas. Population increase here, as in India, had tended to increase the fragmentation of holdings, and this is not conducive to increased output. Mechanisation of larger units provides no solution in Japan for geographical and social reasons; at best, small scale mechanisation may give farmers added leisure and their wives sewing machines. In other parts of Asia, co-operative organisation may well prove to be the major cause of increased output. Indian experience has shown that this may raise production by as much as 20 per cent. As new techniques are utilised, and this without mechanisation or the disturbing of existing land patterns.

In all areas, industrialisation is seen as an essential part of the process of raising living standards; it helps absorb surplus labour, can increase productivity and enhance national self sufficiency. Yet it raises different problems in different parts of Asia, largely because of the variations in resources and the differing levels of economic development. To Pakistan, the immediate problem has been to create industries integrated to her jute and cotton culture when partition left her with neither factories nor technical know-how. India lacks minerals other than coal, iron-ore and bauxite. She is slowly developing a balanced economy under the Five Year Plan, which is however in some directions little more than a blueprint. Illiteracy and the absence of technical skills impose certain limits on the tempo of industrialisation.

For Japan, the central problem is the rehabilitation and re-adjustment of her pre-war industries so that their competitive efficiency in world markets can be fully used to expand trade and so help resolve her shortage of food-stuffs: the shrinkage of Japanese territory after the war makes her dependent upon imports for one-fifth of her needs. Heavy damage from bombing and the relatively chaotic state of her economy in the immediate post-war years have meant that technically Japan is lagging further behind most western countries than she was in 1939. The capacity of the Japanese textile industry is only half what it was pre-war; much of the machinery was dismantled for scrap during the war. With wage costs rising as a result of the Labour Standards Law, inflation, and trade union pressure, with many Asian countries developing their own textile industries, Japan's competitive efficiency here has been seriously reduced and the demand for many grades of textiles has fallen. Shortage of foreign currency is making difficult access to adequate supplies of raw materials, and to-day the value of the imports of raw materials exceeds the value of the exports of textiles. It may be necessary for many textile factories and textile workers to be switched to other kinds of production. The heavy industries are further handicapped by high costs of raw materials and a lag in technical skills as well as by rising wages. Wage costs in all industries are very rigid because of the practice of keeping on staff when not fully employed. This is a matter of deliberate policy in a country where social services are still lagging and where sharp rises in unemploy-

ment would have serious social and political repercussions. The overall picture of Japanese industry is a somewhat discouraging one. Deflationary monetary policies are temporarily necessary and increased per capita production is necessary to enable Japan to re-enter or expand her pre-war markets.

The recovery of Japanese industry is linked with the role of the *Zaibatsu*. For political reasons primarily, SCAP policy set as one of its major objectives the dissolution of the *Zaibatsu*. Only in this way it was felt could the dangerous combination of financial power with the army and political parties be averted. To most Japanese, this western view of the role of the *Zaibatsu* was a mistaken one: the connections were neither as strong nor as permanent as Western observers believed. The close relationship was an historical accident arising out of the need for both capital and technical know-how at a time when both were scarce in Japan. In Japanese eyes, the *Zaibatsu* had been reluctant allies of the army, not the unreluctant and somewhat sinister collaborators the West believed. Whatever the historical facts — and here there will continue to be a difference of opinion — one aspect of the "reverse course," earlier in point of time than most of the other changes, has been the revival of *Zaibatsu* power. The evidence on the degree of its revival is conflicting⁵. There appears to be a distinct and perhaps necessary trend to industrial concentration in a new form, and Japanese managers and directors are collaborating closely. There is, however, little indication that industrial power is being re-concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families. The purely economic advantages of such concentration are considerable and a partial revival of *Zaibatsu* power in a new form may be a necessary condition of rapid Japanese industrialisation and perhaps rearmament. Capital is extremely scarce; bank interest rates are high and so also are company dividends. Relatively little is being ploughed back into industry and the major source of capital for the re-equipment of industry seems to be the Government itself. Japan may well be faced with a choice between economic efficiency and democratic controls. The important thing is that as the concentration of economic power takes place, there should be no revival of the old connections between the economic groups, the army and politics.

IV

For all the Pacific and Asian countries the question of markets is an important one: relatively cheap foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods are essential to maintaining or improving standards of living. To Japan the problem of overseas trade is an increasingly acute one, especially in view of the rising internal costs. Although a balance with the sterling area has been restored, there is at present a gap of 700 million dollars between Japanese imports and exports, a gap covered largely by the arti-

5. See T. A. Bisson: *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan*, *passim*.

ficial process of the injection of American capital for military expenditure. The serious unbalance in Japanese trade with Australia is causing some concern. With the introduction of licensing in 1952, imports from Japan fell from £43.6 million in 1951-2 to £6.5 million in 1953-4. Exports reached £56 million in 1953-4. It is appreciated that Australia can provide, by any increase in imports from Japan, only a small contribution to the Japanese trade balance. Yet small contributions by Australia, Canada and New Zealand can in total be important. The solution may well lie in developing larger markets of South Asia and in a shift in the type of exports. Increasing efficiency in medium and heavy industries, especially in engineering, steel and capital goods industries, can regain some of the advantages lost after the war and compensate for the gradual drying up of older textile markets as new Asian industries develop.

A widely held assumption amongst foreign economists has been that there could be no complete recovery of Japanese industry without the re-opening of the China market. Before the war, China (including Manchuria and Kwantung Province) provided between 14 and 16 per cent. of Japan's imports. Exports to China between 1930 and 1939 fluctuated considerably for military and political reasons: despite a small drop owing to a Chinese boycott over the Manchurian incident, they rose from 18.7 per cent. of Japan's total exports in 1930 to a peak of 34.1 per cent. in 1939. This was, of course, largely the result of the creation of the special economic bloc between Japan, Manchuria and China between 1937 and 1939. After the war, there was a sharp decline, and the 1950 peak showed that China absorbed only 2.4 per cent. of Japan's exports and provided her with only 4.1 per cent. of her imports. The embargo on the export of strategic materials to Communist China, imposed in December 1950, reduced these percentages to 0.3 per cent. and 1.2 per cent. respectively in 1953.⁶

Japanese opinion at the Conference was sharply divided on the potential value of the China market. There was agreement that the American embargo on the export of strategic commodities constituted a serious obstacle to trade, and that its revision or abolition would at worst throw the onus of determining the volume of trade on China. The older school of Japanese economists tended to estimate its importance in terms of its pre-war value. A newer school of thought, represented by both businessmen and economists, is frankly sceptical. It recognises that imports of coking coal from Manchuria could be paid for in non-dollar currency, but the price of such coal, taking into account its inferior quality, is very little below the cost of importing high-grade coking coal from North America. There are no political or delivery problems here. China is concerned primarily at present with internal problems and internal trade. The expansion of Chinese industry is imposing increasingly heavy

6. T. Miyashita: *Observations on the Trade Relation between Japan and China* (Japan Supplementary Paper, No. 2) pp. 2-4.

demands upon her own resources of raw materials, and external trade is of relatively little importance except in so far as it can increase her own industrial and military potential. China is at present driving the hardest possible bargains: trade with her is primarily a political rather than an economic matter. There is little evidence that China is prepared to attempt to re-establish a normal relationship of mutual interdependence between Japan and herself. This view was borne out by British, French and Australian delegates with recent experience of China. Accordingly, this school of thought in Japan looks rather to South East and South Asian markets as providing the real solution to Japan's trading problems. A further contributory factor would be a general liberalisation of national trade policies and admission of Japan to full membership of G.A.T.T. so that she would become entitled to most favoured nation treatment.

Investment and aid programmes bulk largely in any plans for economic development in Asia. Every Asian country is faced with an acute problem of capital accumulation. In post-war Japan, 90 per cent. of family income goes to consumption, and 10 per cent. to taxation: none is available as savings. Japanese industry is forced to fall back in large measure upon ploughed-back profits, yet the amount available is inadequate: 50 per cent. of corporate profits go in taxes, 32-34 per cent. go in dividends and only the remaining 16-18 per cent. is available for re-investment. Pakistan and India estimate that an annual investment of approximately 6 per cent. of their national income is necessary to finance essential developmental projects. This is considerably more than it is possible to raise by taxation or internal loans. Pakistan has introduced sumptuary legislation to mobilise the savings of women, dangling from the ear or adorning the neck. The inability of governments to bridge the gap between capital accumulation and public as well as private needs makes more urgent the need to obtain foreign investment. What are the conditions most favourable to such investment?

Surplus funds are of course available but they are not unlimited, nor as one delegate pointed out, "do they appear like rabbits out of a conjurer's bottomless hat, as the result of appropriate political incantations from the would-be borrowing government." Private investors have tended to fight shy of investment in Asia unless there was a possibility of a net return of some nine per cent. Opportunities for domestic investment offered only slightly smaller returns with far fewer risks. To the private investor, Canadian, British or American, the attractions of a stable government, low taxation and the absence of discrimination in the remission of profits are important considerations. In Asia, the attraction of natural resources is weak and all governments impose restrictions varying in severity upon foreign investors. During the heyday of private investment, between 1870 and 1914, the volume of saving was abnormally high in Great Britain, and approximately 10 per cent. of the national income was being invested abroad. In too many instances, investment was accompanied by ex-

plotation and some form of political control. It was this belief that foreign investment spelt political servitude that led most Asian countries to impose rigorous conditions upon such investment. The sensitivity to interference was greatest in the newly independent states which had won their independence from the old colonial powers. India for example has borrowed heavily internally and externally to expatriate British capital after 1947. The net result of these restrictions has been to make private capital more timid and so put a bottom to the conjurer's hat.

Direct private investment is becoming increasingly rare except for the development of raw materials or for the evasion of tariffs by the establishment of local factories. The alternatives are government borrowing, government to government loans or some form of international assistance through one of the aid programmes or the International Bank. An Indian economist, accepting the contention that private investment in Asia was likely to be small, suggested that the American government should shoulder the responsibility. Loans between governments could accept greater risks than individual investors. The American government, while prepared to make available large sums for aid programmes, was not prepared to let the tax-payer also carry a risk premium for government lending in Asia. The Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation, a consortium of private merchant bankers with specialised knowledge and backed by the government, was prepared to make limited funds available to the Commonwealth countries. It lacked the resources to stretch credit further. The role of mutual aid programmes, such as the Colombo Plan, and of technical assistance programmes such as Point Four and U.N. is a considerable but limited one. The Colombo Plan, measured against Asian needs for capital and skills, is on too small a scale: as an Indian delegate put it, it is a "good-will gesture with some money in it." The real value of such a scheme lies in the fact that it is international, that it provides for mutual aid, and that there are no political strings attached. There is a real danger that recipient countries will see aid plans as the entering wedge of a new imperialism. For this reason, Australia leaves the initiative in suggesting new plans to the Asian countries themselves. Canada, in determining whether it will support a particular project proposed to it, is concerned with knowing whether, once it is started, the recipient country will then be able to carry it forward itself. All the discussions on foreign investment and aid programmes revealed the widespread sensitivity in Asia to possible encroachments upon national sovereignty. It is largely this fear which lies at the root of much of the suspicion of the exceptionally generous American aid to Asia through a variety of agencies, national and international. There is a widespread preference for American aid channelled through international bodies which have no particular political affiliations. In some instances there was a cynical refusal to accept the view that America was providing aid out of generosity. An Indian delegate suggested that the only way to deal with the problem was to apply internationally the method of differential taxation,

dear to the heart of all national treasurers: "just as within a country the better-off regions or classes are called upon to support development in the less advanced regions, so in the international community we may have to move to the theory of taxing the better-off countries to aid the lesser."⁷ The proposal for Japanese admission to the Colombo Plan was on the whole well received. Her contribution could lie in the provision of technical aid rather than, as one Japanese delegate suggested, in the export of older capital equipment as Japanese industries were re-tooled.

All plans for capital investment and mutual economic aid came up against the real problem of their political implications and the effect of re-armament upon the volume of aid. It was politically more possible for any government to make grants or loans to a friendly government with the knowledge that almost inevitably this would strengthen the political stability of that government. Every government was acutely conscious of the increasingly heavy burden imposed by mounting international tension. The acceptance of American military aid by Pakistan was due in no small measure to a realisation that this would free funds for economic development. India's suspicion of S.E.A.T.O. arises in part out of the feeling that it would tend to freeze existing lines of political division and divert to armaments capital better used for developmental work in the area. Japan would prefer a policy of neutralism of the Swiss type with a minimum expenditure on re-armament. This view, not a unanimous one, is based partly on the assumption that such neutrality would be respected on the outbreak of a new Pacific war, or that at worst, America in her own interests would be compelled to defend Japan against aggression. The "reverse course" was revelant in assessing Japanese attitudes here. The concensus of opinion was that should Japan re-arm, she should make it clear that her purpose in so-doing was defensive, that she had no offensive arms and that the military clique would not return to power. At the same time, there was a strong and vocal pacifist movement in Japan, totally opposed to re-armament of any kind. This group, together with the Swiss neutralist bloc, were opposed by an increasingly strong body of opinion which saw in Japanese entry to a defensive regional bloc the only real security against external attack.

At the back of the discussions on economic matters which occupied by far the bulk of agenda, lurked the problem of the cold war and an expanding communism. Basically, few Asian countries would dissent from the Indian view that the "real competition between the parliamentary democratic way and communism is on the plane of economic development, and unless the parliamentary democracies match them, the attraction of Communism is tremendous . . . we must demonstrate that economic development under parliamentary democracy has really gotten started."⁸ There would be little dissent by Western democracies from this proposition.

7. Rapporteur's Report: Topic C. Round Table 1.

8. Ibid.

Where they would join issue with India and Indonesia, and here they would be supported by Pakistan the Philippines, would be that skilful propaganda, the threat of infiltration and the arming of minority communist groups gave no real opportunity to test the relative merits of the competing politico-economic programmes. Neutralism can be an expensive luxury, and it is a moot point as to whether either India or Indonesia would be in a position to control communism at home if other powers were not containing communism abroad. "Peaceful co-existence" meant different things east and west of the bamboo curtain: "two men may sleep on the same pillow, yet dream different dreams." The dreams of democratic countries are apt to take a nightmarish quality while wars are still being waged in Malaya, Burma and the Philippines, and Thailand was faced with the threat of liberation.

The Indian neutralist position was put cogently by Vidya P. Dutt and Vishal Singh in their data-paper on "Indian Policy and Attitudes towards Indo-China and the SEATO." Its was read with respect but did not convince. Delegates expressed little satisfaction with the outcome of the Indo-China truce and some apprehension about the effect of the recently concluded SEATO pact. In its initial form (Sept. Oct. 1954) it added little to the effective military strength of the region: until SEATO were given teeth and its membership increased, its importance would be largely psychological. Its underlying assumption appeared to be that military measures would be the most effective in combatting an expansive or imperialistic communism; too little attention was given to constructive economic measures in dealing with a multiple menace, social and economic, intellectual and political as well as military.

In one sense the discussions at Kyoto resembled Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: no consideration of Asian living standards or of economic development could be complete without relating them to China and Chinese problems. Here the conference was considerably handicapped: no Chinese delegates were present, no data-papers from Peking were presented, and recent first-hand knowledge of Chinese conditions was confined to less than five or the hundred delegates. Reports of the stability of the new government impressed the conference and perhaps strengthened the feeling in favour of general recognition and admission to U.N. The estimated increase of China's population from 603 to 800 million by 1967 emphasised the magnitude of China's economic problems and lent point to the adage that the rich grow richer and the poor produce children. The disturbing thing was the growing rigidity of Communist theory and practice in a monolithic state and the creation of an artificial and unreal picture of the external world. The prospects of a friendly breaching of the new Chinese wall are not inviting.

A conference such as the Kyoto conference is valuable partly because of the quality of the research which went into the forty-odd data-papers

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from the national councils and international secretariat. Its value lies too in the free interchange and discussion of ideas and points of view round the table, in the opportunities for greater understanding and for the elimination of mental road-blocks. On occasion there was too great a tendency to consider problems in terms of the schematic economics of the revised agenda, a process which on occasion tended to inhibit discussion by delegations in which the economists were in a minority. While the central theme at Kyoto was the problem of economic development and the raising of living standards in Asia, an important secondary theme was the changing pattern of political power and its effect upon economic development. It is a pity that the conference tended to burke the issues; it became instead the ghost of Hamlet's father, haunting the discussions of the Third Round Table.

For Australians, the Conference served at once to underline the importance of establishing closer relations with their Asian neighbours, neighbours however unfamiliar with, sometimes even indifferent to, Australian problems. Australian immigration policy evoked not the slightest ripple of interest or comment. On the other hand there was an acute awareness in Japan of the state of unbalance in Australian trade relations with Japan. The great contribution that all Pacific countries can make to the solution of Japanese problems is to help create a climate of opinion in which Japan can find a job. An intelligent re-examination of Australian trade policy towards one of her best customers would make such a contribution. Failure to help Japan to enter world markets could jeopardise the success of parliamentary democracy in Japan. While unaware of the reception which Japanese war brides had obtained in Australia, most Japanese were conscious of the persistence of war-time prejudices in Australia. The rousing welcome to Australia's Frank Sedgeman while the conference was in progress contrasted markedly with the indifference, if not hostility, which subsequently met the visiting Japanese baseball team to Australia. One function of the Australian delegation was to reassure representative Japanese — businessmen, academics and the press — that such attitudes were not typical of Australia as a whole.

Some Educational Problems Of The Pacific Islands.

By The Hon. Camilla H. Wedgwood.

The education of peoples living in the so-called backward areas of the world has become a subject of increasing interest of recent years. The principal reason for this is probably that the economic potentialities of those areas were recognised as being urgently important to the industrialised civilisations during World War II. It was realised that to exploit these potentialities to the full it would be necessary to invoke the co-operation of the indigenous peoples, and that if these were to play their part adequately they must be better fitted for it technically and physically. At the same time the political emancipation of such countries as India and Pakistan, the part played by the dark-skinned peoples during the war, and the ideals officially endorsed in the Atlantic Charter led to a greater awareness on the part of Europeans¹ that these peoples have a right to better conditions than most of them now enjoy. James Yen's saying: "Three-fourths of the world's population are under-housed, under-clothed, underfed and illiterate" has become a slogan which touches the conscience and the imagination of at least some of those comprising the remaining quarter. It is believed that these conditions can be improved permanently only by educating the people—by giving them more knowledge, new technical skills, and a wider social and intellectual horizon. Thus it has come about that, in the words of a British educationalist from Africa, education, which has always been the Cinderella of the Colonial Service "is to-day at the ball, dancing with the prince."²

When she went to the ball Cinderella was transformed by her godmother and appeared very different from the ash-grimed kitchenmaid she had been. The education of backward peoples has undergone a somewhat similar transformation; a new conception has arisen of its true nature and purpose. Prior to 1940 the educational responsibilities of an administering power were conceived as being the provision of primary schooling for children and of technical training for a relatively small proportion of the male adolescents. In a few dependent territories primary schooling for all children between the ages of six and 14 was almost achieved, but in most even this seemingly modest ambition was a goal

1. I use the term "European" to include all peoples of European ancestry, whether living in Europe, North or South America, Australasia, Asia or Africa.
2. The Rev. R. W. Stopford in an address to the Colonial Office Summer School held at Oxford in 1947. He added the grave warning: "I am a little anxious about what will happen when the clock strikes twelve."

on the very far horizon. In addition there was some provision in the larger territories for secondary schooling which could lead as far as matriculation to a European university. This however touched only a minute proportion of the total indigenous population. Except in French territories and in those administered by the United States, the main burden of educational work was carried by the various religious missions assisted by grants-in-aid from the government (never lavish and often wholly incommensurate with the work done) and under some degree of government control. The type of schooling varied considerably as between the territories of the different Powers. The French have always followed a policy of colonial assimilation, and in accordance with this the schools in their territories have been designed to reproduce those of France, with the same syllabuses, the same textbooks and the same examinations. In American Samoa too the schools were brought into line with the pattern of primary schools in the United States, having the same curricula, though not explicitly as the expression of any clearly defined policy of assimilation. In the British³ territories the policy has never been one of assimilation in the French sense, and except in the early days of some of the secondary schools there was no fixed intention of creating in the Colonies and other territories replicas of English schools. But neither was there any clearly conceived idea of what the educational needs of the indigenous peoples were, and of how to relate what was taught in the schools to the social and physical environment of the children. In fact the chief effort of teachers in the great majority of schools for natives was expended upon teaching the children to speak, read and write English, and intentionally or unintentionally everything else was sacrificed to this. The Europeans in the dependent territories needed to draw upon the native population for men to fill the lower posts in the public service, to act as clerks and storekeepers, to serve as skilled and semi-skilled technicians and artisans. These needs largely determined the type of schooling given to the children—especially the emphasis upon learning English—and the types of technical training given to adolescents. They are also partly responsible for the indifference to the education of girls, if not its complete neglect. Adult education, apart from technical training was almost unknown. The secondary schools even when not a conscious attempt to imitate the grammar schools of England in every detail followed a wholly European curriculum. Thus, in the British territories native education prior to 1940 was concerned almost wholly with the schooling of children and the technical training of youths; the curricula were related to a utilitarian end which assumed as permanent a relation between the European and the native of social and economic supremacy on the one hand and subordination on the other; its aim was assumed to

3. The term "British" is used to include all the component nations of the British Commonwealth. To a very great extent the educational policy and practice of the United Kingdom in respect of her dependent territories has also been that of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

be to give to as many children as possible a knowledge of elementary arithmetic, some familiarity with English as a spoken and written language, and to a limited number of males a technical or professional training which would enable them to be usefully drawn into the administrative and commercial activities of the Europeans living in the territory. Only in the field of religious education seemingly was the horizon wider than this. There was also a facile assumption that by giving a "good education" to a few, these few would, like leaven in dough, raise the mass of their fellows and bring about a general improvement in ideas and living conditions. That this assumption is false we now know all too well. Instead there has grown up an educated elite, out of touch with the ways and thoughts of their own people, unaccepted by the Europeans, frustrated and resentful;⁴ while the mass of the people continue to live in very much the same condition as their forefathers did, sometimes in worse conditions, "under-clothed, under-housed, underfed and illiterate." For the type of primary schooling given has not in fact done much to satisfy the needs of even those who received it. There has been a great deal of educational wastage, because the subjects learnt in school were uncorrelated with life in the village, and so were forgotten.

From time to time individuals concerned with education in different British dependencies urged that the primary schooling given to native children should be made more relevant to the life of their villages, and that more serious attention should be given to teaching improved methods of agriculture, and to crafts by which they could as adults improve the standard of living in the villages. But it was not until the publication of the *Report on Mass Education in Africa* in 1944 that it was brought home to those concerned that in British Africa profound changes in the educational system would be necessary to achieve any real permanent improvement in the conditions of people, and to hasten the economic development of the country. The *Report* stressed the need to educate the adults as well as the children, the females as well as the males, and for education to be conceived as something which is concerned with all aspects of native life because, in fact, no one aspect can be isolated from the others. The tenor of the report showed a significant shift of emphasis—from education and training as a preparation for earning a wage as an employee, to education and training for improved community living. This shift of emphasis was associated with a new awareness of the important place of the vernacular in education, of the urgent need to educate the girls and women—the wives and mothers—and of the importance of relating schoolroom instruction to practical activities connected with the needs of the community.

4. France through her educational policy in her dependent territories has also created an educated elite, but not generally a resentful one, for she has guarded against the training of men for more jobs than are available, and, more important, full French citizenship is open to any native who in life and language has accepted the civilisation of France. The gap between the educated native who is a French citizen, and the ordinary native villager is just as serious a matter in France d'Outre Mer as in British dependent territories.

Most of the important surveys and experiments in native education which have been carried out during the past 10 years have been concerned with Africa. In the British territories in the Pacific educational developments have lagged behind those of British territories elsewhere. There are several reasons for this: the relative remoteness of the islands and their small population being the two most obvious. Since 1945 however, native welfare in general and education as an integral part of native welfare have been receiving increasing attention in this region of the world. The interest shown in education by the South Pacific Commission is significant: it has initiated research into linguistics, technical education, the use of radio and visual aids as media of mass communication, and such related matters; it has been responsible for launching two interesting pilot projects in community development (the Moturiki project in Fiji and the Nimboran project in Netherlands New Guinea); it has established the South Pacific Literature Bureau whose concern is the provision of reading matter of all kinds for the island peoples within the Commission's area. Another significant step in the development of native education in the Pacific Islands was the establishment in January 1952 of the Educational Research Institute for Fiji and West Pacific Territories. In the Australian Territories of Papua and New Guinea a Department of Education was established for the first time in 1946, and with very ample funds it planned a vigorous campaign to make good the educational leeway lost during the war, and to expand and improve, in collaboration with the religious missions, the educational work in many directions. New Zealand re-examined the educational policy and programme of her island territories, and has become responsible for a series of vernacular school readers (for Samoa, the Cook Islands and Niue) which are outstanding. The United States likewise has been re-examining her educational policy in Eastern Samoa, and with characteristic vigour is carrying out a wide educational programme in her Trust Territories.⁵

There are many difficulties to be surmounted before the education of the Pacific Islanders can be developed satisfactorily, some of them very great ones. Moreover, experience gained in one island group can to only a limited extent be used as a sure guide to work in other island groups, for there is great cultural diversity, and the patterns of contact between the European and the native cultures are not everywhere the same. Education has been defined as the sum of all those processes which equip the individual for adult life in his or her community. The shape of this life depends upon the cultural environment of the community. For this reason what is educationally right and relevant for the cultural

5. In French Oceania and New Caledonia and Dependencies, the French educational policy and programme continues very much as it was before the war, based as in other French Territories on the policy of assimilation. In the Condominium of the New Hebrides, administrative difficulties appear to be a serious stumbling block in the way of improving native education.

environment found in one region may well prove unsatisfactory and irrelevant for different cultural environment in another group of islands. Moreover, to-day all the island cultures are changing as a result of contact with Europeans. In some places the contact has not been very intense, has been very gradual, and there is little reason to believe that it will become more rapid and more penetrating in the next 10 or 20 years. This is true of such places as the Gilbert Islands (apart from the outlier Ocean Island) where even to-day apart from the few Administration officers and a few missionaries, white people are scarce and there are no important European economic undertakings employing indigenous labour. In other places the contact has been intense and violent, sometimes so much so as to have disrupted native society and stimulated depopulation to such an extent that as yet the people have not recovered. In the Carolines and Marianas, in New Guinea and the Solomons the process of culture contact was made much more severe and was speeded up by the events of 1941 to 1945, and for strategic and economic reasons it seems probable that the intensity of the contact will continue for some years to come. Within the last 12 years the international politics of the great sovereign states, their economic interests, and the development of air transport have brought almost all the island peoples into closer and probably more permanent contact with European and Asiatic peoples than could have been envisaged a generation ago. Furthermore there is a steadily increasing pressure of population in the East Pacific island groups which has already produced social and economic problems.⁶ Thus profound changes have been going on and will inevitably continue to go on in the cultural environment of most of the Pacific peoples. The stable pattern which with only minor changes seems to have existed for centuries is being destroyed and a new one is forming. But, with the present international and political situations so uncertain, it is beyond our power to foretell with any real assurance what this pattern will be like, what the cultural environment of these islanders will be in even 30 years' time. The educationist is therefore faced with the initial difficulty of having only the most general idea of the salient characteristics of the kind of world for which he must equip both the children and the adults.

It is probably true to say that the one thing all Pacific Islanders have in common to-day is the uncertainty of what awaits them in the near future, of what patterns their lives will take. Since they share this uncertainty, there are certain things which we can be sure they will all need to be equipped for adult life in their community, and which therefore we should aim to give them through their education. These are self-

6. At the beginning of this century much was written and spoken of the depopulation in the Pacific Islands; in Polynesia to-day overpopulation has become a pressing problem in some groups. In the West Pacific increase in population has produced social and economic problems in a few localities, but serious land-hunger is not likely to become general for some generations provided that extensive tracts of good land are not alienated from the natives for non-native use.

confidence and personal dignity, initiative, the ability to think clearly, and a sense of social responsibility. It must be noted that such qualities are developed in children (and in adults) not by formal instruction but through the teaching methods employed in all instruction through the patterns of school organisation, and (partly at least) through the syllabus of the various subjects taught.⁷ Another thing about which the educational planner can be confident is that the basic techniques of learning and communication—the 3Rs—will be needed by all, some understanding of the physical environment and of the social environment will also be needed. (This will involve instruction on the one hand of such subjects as nature study leading to general science and human physiology, and on the other of subjects covering not only the pupil's own cultural background but also the cultures of the peoples with which the pupils' community is directly or indirectly in contact, such as the Europeans, Indians, Chinese, Japanese and Indonesians.) To as many as possible there should also be given a working knowledge of some "world language" (English or French) to serve as a medium of inter-communication between the island peoples who speak different languages as well as for wider contacts through the written word. Without such a means of internal inter-communication political and economic development into larger units than at present exist will not be possible. Moreover, theoretical knowledge must be interpreted and expressed through practical activities if it is to be really meaningful to the learner and to equip him for adult life. Training in the cultivation and conservation of the soil, in skills by means of which housing and sanitation can be improved, in housewifery and mothercraft, is interlocked with the subjects mentioned above.

There seems to be no doubt that the future well-being of the people will require that the tiny political units which have existed in the past, particularly in the West Pacific—the village of from 150 to 500 souls—shall coalesce to form larger ones; that the system of economic co-operation based upon kinship obligations shall develop into or be replaced by some other system which will allow for the change from subsistence cropping and unspecialised skills to the production, with different agricultural techniques, of cash crops, and to the development of village industries. Such changes in the political and economic structure, which have in fact already begun, require that the educationist shall give to pupils in the schools, as well as to adults, some training through actual experience in organising themselves and in managing their affairs, in addition to formal schoolroom instruction in "civics."

It is, one thing to suggest that these things are very generally what the island peoples need as a minimum equipment for life in "the world

7. Thus in Social Studies if we teach history always from the point of view of the European, we necessarily concentrate on the achievements of the European, and often specifically on his mastery over the coloured peoples. This serves to give a native child a sense of the inadequacy of himself and his fellow rather than to build up his self-respect and self-confidence.

round the corner"; it is much more difficult to devise syllabi which will provide these things in the six or eight years of infant and primary schooling which is all that the majority of island children are likely to get; it is even more difficult to ensure that all the children will get even as long a schooling as this. Apart from the technical difficulties connected with the planning of a syllabus which shall ensure that no one type of educative experience is sacrificed for any other, the five greatest obstacles to educational development in the Pacific are geographical isolation, shortage of suitable teachers, multiplicity of languages, dearth of suitable reading matter for use in schools and for the instruction and recreation of adults and shortage of money. All five are interrelated, but can conveniently be examined separately.

Geographical isolation may be of two kinds: the actual distance between human settlements, and inaccessibility. In the East Pacific the former type of isolation is the more common; in West Pacific, especially in such islands as New Guinea, New Britain, and the larger isles of the British Solomons and the New Hebrides, it is inaccessibility which isolates. From the point of view of transport New Guinea is one of the most difficult areas in the world. The small island groups in both east and west Pacific are separated by seas which are often treacherous beating upon coral-infested shores, but within any one island the construction and maintenance of roads capable of taking wheeled vehicles is seldom as daunting an undertaking as it is in New Guinea, and between the isles of a single group regular communication by boat can usually be maintained except in certain seasons. The efficiency of inter-island communications depends very largely upon the economic resources of the islands, and in fact it is lack of valuable exports which chiefly accounts for the isolation of some groups. Isolation and consequent difficulties of transport affect the development of education in two main ways. First, they greatly increase the cost of establishing and maintaining schools. This is obvious when we consider the practical difficulties which have to be overcome to ensure a continuous, adequate supply of paper, books and similar basic tools of learning to villages which are connected with the nearest port or even jetty only by many miles of track traversing rugged country or sago swamps, along which everything has to be carried by human portage. To anyone aware of New Guinea conditions there was something pathetically naive in the query put on behalf of Unesco, as to the number of mobile cinema vans used for educational work in that country. Radio receiving sets, film and filmstrip projectors are types of equipment used with great effect for both fundamental education and in schools in many backward areas of the world where wheeled transport is possible; they are as yet impracticable, except in very restricted areas, for use in the villages of the West Pacific. Even in those parts of the Pacific where the actual transport of such things presents less difficulty, the cost of

distributing, running and maintaining equipment of this kind on a scale which would enable it to be used extensively for adult and child education would be exceptionally heavy. The second way in which transport difficulties handicap educational development is less immediately obvious but perhaps more serious: it is through the inevitable isolation of teachers appointed to village schools. Any teacher, native or European, who has to live cut off from intellectual companionship and stimulus, among people from whom, even if they are his own people, he is to some extent separated through his education, inevitably suffers from this loneliness, and as inevitably his work suffers also. Moreover, unwillingness to face such loneliness deters men from becoming teachers. It is possible to mitigate this isolation, but only by very greatly increasing the teachers attached to Education Department or Mission, and by also greatly increasing expenditure. At present even if the money were available the suitable staff are not.

There seems to be a world shortage of trained teachers to-day. In the Western Pacific far more native and European teachers are needed than are to be had. To the absolute shortage of European teachers must be added the fact that the type of training and experience which they have had in European training centres and schools is not always that most suitable for the special educational needs of the island peoples. The European teacher is usually familiar with only his own cultural environment which he takes for granted; he has been trained in teaching methods deemed appropriate for children born into that same environment and who will supposedly live their adult lives in it. He is usually unaware of the very different problems of cultural adjustment which face his native pupils, and has been given no guidance in how to help them to meet these problems. He is also handicapped in all his contacts with children and adults alike by the fact that he is usually unable to speak their language, and is ignorant of their traditional modes of thought. The shortage of native teachers is less acute, but the inadequacies of most of those who are serving as teachers are lamentable. Very few indeed have had sufficient education themselves. Even in Polynesia where secondary schools exist the standard attained in them is not high, and there are natives teaching who have never completed a secondary education. In the West Pacific there are no schools which reach the status of what is generally implied by the term "secondary school," and the great majority of native teachers have not progressed beyond what might be equated with the fifth grade of primary schooling. To this defective educational background is added usually a period of training, and since village education throughout the West Pacific is predominantly the concern of the religious missions and carried out by native pastors or evangelists, the chief emphasis in their training is religious and not upon the art of teaching. The result is that in the West Pacific the teacher's own lack

of education necessarily makes his teaching mechanical, and he does little to encourage his pupils to think for themselves, to ask questions, or to find out things for themselves by experiment and observation. Even in the East Pacific where the background education and the training of the teachers is better, their limitations are apparent in their treatment of the various school subjects. In isolation the work of such teachers necessarily deteriorates very easily and very noticeably, though their earnestness and sincerity of effort often persist magnificently.

The educational deficiencies of prospective native teachers can be made up, but there is one difficulty less easy to overcome in the training of teachers, particularly in the West Pacific: the need to carry it out, both the theoretical and the practical work, in a foreign language. This has nothing to do with any supposed or real "inadequacy" of the indigenous languages to be used as media for teaching school subjects; it arises from the fact that the students attending any one training centre may well speak different vernaculars. The use of English as the medium of instruction in training centres is therefore almost inevitable in regions where there is a multiplicity of tongues. If this is so, then a very thorough familiarity with English is a prerequisite in every trainee student if he is really to grasp the ideas which underlie what he is being trained to do. It is this lack which is partly responsible for the mechanical, rule-of-thumb teaching which characterises the work of so many native teachers. Moreover, the practice teaching usually has to be carried on in a language foreign to some of the trainees (and often foreign also to the children in the classes), and alien to their whole culture, so that the trainee has no guidance in how to translate what he has learnt in English into the terms of the language and culture of the children whom he will eventually be teaching in their villages.

To the general shortage of European and adequately trained native teachers must be added the dearth of native women teachers. It is generally agreed that in our own society women are more satisfactory than men for teaching at the kindergarten and junior primary level and for adolescent girls. This seems to be true also in native societies, where for adolescent girls and adult women, women teachers are essential. In some Polynesian islands women teachers are common, but the great majority of teachers are men; in the United States' Trust Territories no distinctions are made in qualifications, salary or prospects of advancement between men and women in the education service, but there is a definite preponderance of male teachers. In the West Pacific, with the exception of the schools of one mission in Papua, trained native women teachers are extremely rare.⁸ This is mainly because throughout

8. The Kwato Extension Association, an inter-denominational missionary society, employs almost wholly women teachers. Very careful precautions are taken to guard them against any cause for scandal.

Oceania it is usual for women to begin their married life while still in their teens, and for an unmarried woman to be regarded as socially of no account, and to be suspected of being of easy virtue. In Polynesia and Micronesia the process of acculturation has gone further than in the West, and in the olden days women seem in general to have been less socially and economically subordinate to men; and this may make the training and employment of unmarried women teachers easier. In the West Pacific certainly the education and training of women teachers, and their employment in village schools present difficulties which cannot be ignored.

The third major obstacle to educational development in the Pacific area is the multiplicity of languages. It is now generally agreed by those qualified to express an opinion, that for at least the first four to six years of schooling the medium of instruction should if possible be the language which the pupils habitually speak in their homes; if this is not possible then the medium must be a tongue so familiar to them that they can think and express themselves in it without strain. In Polynesia and in Micronesia the same language with only minor dialectic variations is spoken throughout an island group; here then the use of the vernacular as the medium of instruction throughout the primary school presents no very great difficulties. In the West Pacific, where many languages are spoken by no more than 2,000 to 3,000 people, and some by even fewer, it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, for every child to receive even its first two or three years of schooling in the mother tongue. Educationists have then the task of choosing what shall be the medium of instruction in the primary schools. Social as well as educational considerations have to be taken into account. So far there is no agreement. There appear to be three choices: the use of "regional vernaculars"; the use of English; the use of a pidgin language of which "pidgin English" is at present the most widely used for intercommunication between natives.⁹ Each choice has its drawbacks, some educational, some social. On educational grounds alone a regional vernacular (a tongue linguistically and culturally allied to the pupils' mother tongue) is probably the best choice for use at the primary and lower levels, and English the least satisfactory. The objection to English as the medium of instruction at these levels is that it is so dissimilar in structure from the island languages, and is the product and expression of a culture so utterly unlike that in which the pupils are living, that its use adds to the difficulty of understanding and assimilating new concepts, and of developing the child's powers of thinking and of self-expression. Whatever language is chosen as the medium of instruction, if it is not the pupils' own mother tongue, then the fact that

9. Until recently Malay was used as the *lingua franca* and the medium of education in Netherlands New Guinea. The ease with which this language can be learnt, and the fact that already there are a fair number of suitable instructional books published in it, are in its favour as a medium of instruction here and elsewhere in the West Pacific. There are, however, certain important drawbacks to its use.

the child has to acquire new knowledge, has to learn to think and to express himself all in a foreign language, and that the teacher may have to teach in a language foreign to himself, necessarily handicaps both pupils and teacher very seriously.

From the point of view of vernacular education of children and of adults the multiplicity of languages in the Pacific area makes the adequate provision of books more difficult than in regions of less linguistic variety. Vernacular reading matter, for both instruction and recreation, is very important for community development as well as for teaching in schools. In most of the Polynesian island groups where the vernacular is used in primary education, the literacy rate is almost as high as in Western Europe, and vernacular news sheets or newspapers are produced and widely read. But more than this is needed if the people are to make any further progress in economic or political development. For those who cannot read English the range of reading matter is indeed small. In the West Pacific the situation as regards adult reading matter is worse. Recreational reading matter for children is almost unknown everywhere in the Pacific. No one language is spoken by a sufficient number of people to make the production of reading matter in it a financially sound proposition: the cost of production would be excessive in relation to the number of potential buyers. In Africa where one language is spoken by 1,000,000 or more people it is legitimate to subsidise the production of vernacular literature for a while, in order to build up a reading public; but with a maximum of about 30,000 speaking any one tongue, a reading public capable of ultimately bearing the whole cost of a published vernacular literature seems to be out of the question. At present news-sheets, religious publications and a very few technical pamphlets are being issued in the West Pacific, either in a regional vernacular or in pidgin, but the cost of these is largely or wholly defrayed by the administration or by a mission. Vernacular readers for use in the schools are being produced in increasing numbers, but they will probably remain a permanent charge on the various Education Departments. Turning from books in the vernacular to books in English, we find that here too there is a dearth of ones suitable for the education and the recreation of children and adults in the Pacific. It is the content of the books as well as the language which presents difficulties. Books used and read by those whose mother tongue is English are seldom satisfactory for this purpose. The language is too difficult both in its sentence patterns and in the range of vocabulary; the cultural setting is too alien for the contents to be truly comprehended. Some books have been published during the past 10 years in simple, scientifically "controlled" English, but most of them have been written specifically for African readers, and are concerned with primarily African topics, though some have a more general background. School books written in English for use in countries where English is the mother tongue and the cultural environment is Euro-

pean, vary greatly in educational value and in the approach which they use to their subject. In that they draw their examples from the background of life in, say, Australia or the U.S.A., they are all unsatisfactory for use in the islands, for such examples can hardly be meaningful to pupils living in Samoa or the New Hebrides. Again topics which are significant to an Australian or American child, and rightly are included in its syllabus, do not necessarily, perhaps do not usually quicken the imagination and intelligence of a child whose background is a village in the Caroline Islands or the Solomons and to whose life they are irrelevant. Conversely, there is much in the life of the islanders which they need to know about, and which never appears in English school books because it has no place in the background of the children for whom these books were primarily written. A number of school books have been written in English against a non-English background, but in most the background has again been Africa, and although this is probably less alien to that of the Pacific Islander than the European background is, there are too many differences for these books to be used wholly successfully in Oceanic schools. A beginning has been made in producing English and vernacular reading books for the islands but much more needs to be done. Nor can it be done successfully unless those engaged in this work understand more than most Europeans do, the emotional and intellectual, as well as the material background of children living in their native villages.

The training of a sufficient number of teachers and the production of sufficient and suitable reading material as well as the building of schools and provision of teaching equipment is ultimately dependant upon sufficient money. Probably no Department of Education in any part of the world has ever felt that it has had enough to do all that it would like to do. In Oceania the need for economy and for expending what funds are available to the best possible advantage are all the more pressing because of the educational lag which has to be made up. The minimum aim of all the administering Powers in the Pacific to-day is for the indigenous peoples to have universal, free compulsory primary schooling, and sufficient technical and vocational training to enable them to play an effective part in the development of their country. At present the money for this is being largely supplied by the administering Power from local taxation supplemented by direct grants. Where the provision for native education is drawn wholly from the revenues of the Territory, native education is indeed Cinderella sitting among the kitchen ashes. With inadequate funds for carrying out at once all the educational advances which are needed, the question arises how best to expend what is available. Is it wise to concentrate upon giving a relatively good education to a selected few, who can then be given technical or vocational training and employed by the European administrator for service among the rest of the population, or by the commercial firms in the economic development of the country?

Or is it better to aim at giving a minimal education to as many of the people as possible with the aim of first raising the general standard of living, and to treat post-primary and technical education as meanwhile of subsidiary importance? There are valid arguments for and against both policies. Moreover in the West Pacific and in certain parts of the East Pacific also there are two factors in the situation which cannot be ignored. The education of the natives affects the Europeans living in the islands. It is to the interest of the plantation manager and of others engaged in commerce to be able to employ skilled native workmen and native clerks; such employers have little interest in the education of the ordinary villager, and is generally suspicious of it. In addition the Government departments of health, agriculture (and education) urgently need natives sufficiently well-educated to be trained for specialist service, and all departments require trained native clerks. Thus the European interests tend to be in favour of the first policy indicated above, and to press for a type of "utilitarian" schooling which is educationally too narrow, and is therefore inadequate as a preparation for adult life. There is, moreover, the real danger that this policy tends to create a class of "white-collar" workers and social misfits. The other factor which cannot be ignored is the demands of the native peoples themselves, and these do not appear to be everywhere the same. In some parts the cry is for universal primary schooling above all; in others the demand is rather for an increase in technical and vocational training.

In this paper I have been concerned mainly with primary schooling and with adult education, because they are in my opinion the most urgent in the Pacific. Secondary education, technical and vocational training have their own special problems to be solved, some of which arise out of the obstacles which impede the development of primary education. These obstacles are not insuperable, but to overcome them money is needed, and more European educationists with vision and the ability to understand the life and the perplexities of the native peoples to-day.

Soviet Government Changes Since Stalin

by T. H. RIGBY

This article does not aim at giving an overall description and interpretation of the organisational and leadership changes since Stalin's death, but only of those affecting the all-Union Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers, consisting of the Premier, Deputy Premiers, Ministers and the heads of certain other state agencies (Gosplan, the State Bank, etc.) is defined in the Soviet Constitution as the Government of the U.S.S.R.,¹ but its position is scarcely comparable with that of the Cabinet in a non-communist state. In the first place its great size² (over 60 during most of the postwar period) precludes its functioning effectively as a committee, and it seems certain that matters which cannot be settled within an individual Ministry are normally referred for decision not to a meeting of the Council of Ministers as a whole, but to its Presidium.

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers (not to be confused with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or the Presidium of the Communist Party's Central Committee) comprising the Premier and Deputy Premiers and totalling fourteen members on the eve of Stalin's death, may thus be regarded as the Soviet "Cabinet." Certain basic features of the Soviet political system define the role of this "cabinet," in particular the concentration in the State of control over all aspects of the life of society, and the reservation to Party bodies and full-time Party officials of all important current policy decisions.³ Thus on the one hand the scope of authority of the Presidium of the Soviet's Council of Ministers far exceeds that of a non-communist cabinet, while on the other the more important matters are taken out of its hands by the Presidium (formerly Politburo) of the Communist Party's Central Committee. There is considerable overlapping in the membership of these two bodies (more on this below) and the relationship between them may be better compared with that between a "political" and an "administrative" cabinet than between the cabinet and the party executive in a Western country.

The impact of these features of Soviet political life falls more heavily upon the individual ministers, who combine a maximum of administrative responsibility with a minimum of independent authority. They are thus well placed to enjoy along with the provincial party bosses, the doubtful honour of being favourite scapegoats for the failure of centrally prescribed policies. Never-

1. See Chapter V of Soviet Constitution, esp. articles 68-73; *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo* (Soviet Public Law), Moscow, 1948, pp. 393-400.

2. Constitution, articles 73 and 77.

3. *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo*, p. 285. Decisions of Party bodies "have the force of law"—*ibid*, p. 286.

theless, they are far from being political nonentities. They form an important recruiting field to the top leadership,⁴ and again in company with the provincial party leaders, are mostly full or candidate members of the Party's Central Committee.⁵

While it would be difficult to find a precedent for the violent changes of organisation and composition which the Council of Ministers has undergone since Stalin's death, such changes on a smaller scale are a permanent feature of the regime. The ministerial structure is constantly being revised as a reflection of the current importance of this or that sphere of government activity or of fluctuations in the leadership's ideas on the proper size of the Council of Ministers and the desirable degree of administrative centralisation.⁶ Such changes will often also have political significance, since a ministerial reorganisation may effect the power position of the member of the Presidium responsible for the sphere of activity in question. This applies even more, of course, to simple replacements of ministers. It would seem that in the Soviet Union, as in other political structures, leaders prefer as a rule to work through persons who have shown themselves to be loyal subordinates or associates in earlier posts, and there is a direct relationship between the power of a leader and his ability to secure major appointments for former associates.⁷ While Soviet conditions after the '20s ruled out the possibility of leaders building up clear-cut personal "machines" within the overall Stalin "machine," there is no doubt that vaguer groupings were an important feature of political life even under Stalin. For example, Zhdanov's death in 1948 was immediately followed by the removal of a number of Government and Party leaders who had earlier worked under Zhdanov when he was a provincial party secretary.⁸

These general remarks may help to bring out the significance of the post-Stalin changes.⁹

MARCH-JUNE, 1953.

Stalin died on March 5th, 1953, and on the following day there was announced a complete reorganisation of the central party and government organs.¹⁰ The membership of the Council of Ministers was reduced

4. Two of the nine present full members of the Party Presidium—Pervukhin and Saburov, have made their careers almost solely within the government hierarchy, and several others have served as Ministers for lengthy periods.

5. See *Pravda*, October 15, 1952.

6. See Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, Harvard U.P., 1953, pp. 333-335.

7. Fainsod, pp. 201-202.

8. These included one of the Central Committee Secretaries, the Gosplan Chief, the Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and several prominent Party and Government Officials in the provinces.

9. The analysis covers the period up to May, 1955. Little attempt is made in the present article to relate these changes to the movements in Soviet foreign and domestic policy over the past two years. I do not believe that any simple relationship between personnel and policy changes can be demonstrated. They are, of course, not independent of each other, but their connections are often obscure, and any attempt to analyse them for even a short period would require a far longer study than this.

10. *Pravda*, March 6, 1953.

by more than half, in some cases four or even five ministries being merged in one giant ministry, and its Presidium was cut from 14 to five. Malenkov became Premier, and a new title, that of First Deputy Premier, was bestowed upon Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich. These five made up the new Presidium, which did not include Mikoyan, the only plain Deputy Premier left. Simultaneously it was announced for the first time that there had previously existed a "Bureau" within the Presidium and that this was now abolished. The composition of this Bureau can only be guessed, but it must have corresponded more or less to the new reduced Presidium. This meant that the "inner cabinet" or Bureau was retained under a different name, while the broader cabinet disappeared. Of the officials who lost their places on the Presidium through this process, Voroshilov and Andreev were kicked upstairs to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (the former becoming its President), Mikoyan remained a Deputy Premier, and Kosygin, Malyshev, Tevosyan, Pervukhin and Saburov each took charge of one of the new consolidated ministries.¹¹

Stalin's heirs were probably bound to undertake a thorough-going government reorganisation after his death, if only to demonstrate that they possessed the unity to come to a unanimous decision on the most sensitive of all political issues and the power freely to dispose of the careers of the secondary leadership. The precise form this reorganisation took is also not surprising. In reducing the number of ministries and liquidating one of the links in the government hierarchy the top leaders rendered their control more direct and flexible, and the probable cost in administrative efficiency was no doubt felt to be justified in the critical period of the master's passing. At the same time the position of the top government leaders was strengthened both vis-a-vis those members of the Party Presidium who lost their places on the Government Presidium (Mikoyan, Pervukhin, Saburov and Voroshilov) and indirectly vis-a-vis Party Secretary, Khrushchev.

The compromise of March 1953 lasted less than four months. The delicate balance of political forces was upset by the coup against Beria at the end of June and the period since then has been one of continual changes, reflecting the efforts of the various leaders to strengthen their own positions. The principal beneficiaries of the removal of Beria were Khrushchev, who seems to have been at loggerheads with Beria over agricultural policy since at least 1951,¹² and Bulganin who, as Defence Minister, gained by the strengthening of the Army as against the Police which was one of the effects of Beria's arrest.

Malenkov, whose earlier history was curiously linked with that of Beria, was destined to be the main loser but he

11. *Pravda*, March 16, 1953.

12. This is strongly suggested by certain statements made by proteges of Beria in 1951, notably by Bagirov and Arutinov, former Party bosses of Azerbaijan and Armenia respectively, as well as by charges subsequently made against Beria and his "collaborators."

retained the premiership for a further 18 months, thanks perhaps to support from other government leaders who were apprehensive about the increased power of the army and the party, while the latter steadily undermined the foundations of his authority.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE BERIA.

With the growing self-confidence of the new regime, the central administrative structure began to slip back into its former pattern. The membership of the Council of Ministers rose from 29 in mid-1953¹³ to 55 in April 1954¹⁴ and by May 1955 had reached 67,¹⁵ higher than it had been on Stalin's death. In many cases the consolidated ministries were divided into precisely the same units which originally went into them. This applies particularly to the industrial, trading and transport ministries, and with small changes of name, also to the consumer goods ministries. But there were some important exceptions. The Ministry of Agriculture has not yet disgorged cotton-growing and forestry, which were formerly under separate ministries, though it has lost control of the State farms and agricultural procurements. The new and important Ministry of Culture remains, but no longer has jurisdiction over higher education. There has been a proliferation of ministries engaged in construction, from three in Stalin's time to seven in May, 1955, reflecting the renewed emphasis upon the production of capital rather than consumer goods. The Defence Ministry continues to control both Army and Navy, which constituted separate ministries under Stalin.

The breaking up of most of the giant ministries has brought many of the former ministers back to their original posts. However, the number of old faces which have failed to reappear is striking. Only 34 members of Stalin's Council of Ministers are included in the present Government. Of the 32 who have lost their places, the cases of several are to be explained by the continued submergence of their ministries in larger entities (former Ministers for the Navy, Forestry, Cinematography, etc.), while others have been transferred to important posts in other spheres. Of the remainder, many cases are no doubt due simply to considerations of efficiency, health, etc., and have no special political significance. But there remains a residue of replacements which seem clearly to be related to the power-struggle among the Soviet leaders since Stalin's death. The more important of these deserve separate mention.

In December, 1953, the Minister for State Control, Merkulov,¹⁶ was removed and executed shortly afterwards as an accomplice of Beria.¹⁷ Meanwhile Ignatiev, the Minister for State Security ousted by Beria, was

13. *Pravda*, March 16, 1953. There were no changes between this date and the arrest of Beria.

14. *Zasedaniia verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, 4-ogo sozyva, pervaya sessia, stenograficheskii otchet*, pp. 555-558.

15. *Pravda*, February 10, 1955; March 1, 1955; April 7, 1955.

16. *Ibid.*, December 17, 1953.

17. *Ibid.*, December 24, 1953.

reinstated as a provincial party secretary after the latter's execution.¹⁸ The State Security (MGB) forces are now under the control of Serov, who was associated with Khrushchev in tidying up the Ukraine after the purge of 1936-38.¹⁹

Probably the most important single issue in Soviet politics since Stalin's death has been agricultural policy. Malenkov has stated that he was responsible for agriculture for some years before Stalin's death.²⁰ This is probably true, and Khrushchev's highpowered campaign of agricultural reforms since 1953 has no doubt had as one of its principal aims, the discrediting of Malenkov. After Stalin's death all sides of the country's primary industry were concentrated in a super-ministry under the control of one of Malenkov's closest collaborators, A. I. Kozlov.²¹ The process of breaking down this empire began in September 1953, when Kozlov's jurisdiction was reduced to State farms.²² After continued attacks sponsored by Khrushchev he was eventually removed from this post too (in March, 1955)²³ since when he has disappeared from the political scene. Meanwhile another former State Farms Minister, Skvortsov, also came under fire, and was disgraced in 1954.²⁴ Towards the end of 1953, the Ministry for Agricultural Procurements was revived, and placed under Korniets,²⁵ one of Khrushchev's chief subordinates in the Ukraine from 1938 to 1949.²⁶

Another sensitive area has been the Ministry for Culture. When this was set up in March, 1953, it was entrusted to P. K. Ponomarenko, a candidate member of the Party Presidium.²⁷ In February, 1954, however, Ponomarenko was sent as Party Secretary to Kazakhstan, ostensibly to administer Khrushchev's agricultural expansion programme there.²⁸ Early in 1955 he became Ambassador to Poland.²⁹ It would be rash to assume that Ponomarenko is a spent political force, but it is significant that he appears to have lost his place as a candidate member of the Party Presidium.³⁰ Ponomarenko's political career began in 1938 in the Central Committee's Department of Leading Party Organs, then headed by Malenkov, and he later worked as Minister for Agricultural Procurements when Malenkov was in charge of Agriculture.³¹ His departure from the Council

18. As First Secretary of the Bashkir *obkom*, a post he still held in May, 1955.

19. Serov was NKVD Commissar in the Ukraine from the end of the Yezhov purge till World War II. It is of interest that he had a promising army career before entering the NKVD about 1937.

20. *Pravda*, February 9, 1955.

21. Kozlov headed the Central Committee's Agriculture Department for some years before Stalin's death.

22. *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.

23. *Pravda*, March 3, 1955.

24. See Khrushchev's report in *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.

25. *Pravda*, November 26, 1953.

26. Korniets was Premier of the Ukraine before the war, and a vice-Premier from the expulsion of the Germans until 1953.

27. *Pravda*, March 16, 1953.

28. *Ibid*, March 16, 1954.

29. *Ibid*, May 8, 1955.

30. This can only be inferred from reported attendance of leaders at ceremonial functions.

31. See short biography in *Sovetskaya Belorussia*, March 1, 1950.

of Ministers and now from the country therefore looks like a further blow to Malenkov's position. However, his immediate successor as Minister for Culture was G. F. Alexandrov, whose career also seems to tie him to Malenkov.³² Alexandrov was removed in March 1955, for "not providing proper leadership to the ministry," and was succeeded by N. A. Mikhailov, a Party administrator rather than an ideologist, who had earlier succeeded Khrushchev as Party boss of the Moscow region.³³

Other associates of Khrushchev who have recently acquired posts in the Council of Ministers are L. G. Melnikov,³⁴ Minister for the Construction of Enterprises for the Coal Industry and I. K. Kozyulya,³⁵ Minister for Urban and Village Construction. Both Melnikov and Kozyulya worked directly under Khrushchev when he was Party Secretary in the Ukraine.³⁶

Marshal Zhukov's appointment as Defence Minister in February, 1955,³⁷ may reflect the increased political influence of the army. Zhukov, the most popular of Russia's military leaders, was in eclipse for some years after the war, but with Stalin's death became a First Deputy Minister for Defence, along with Marshal Vasilevsky, and immediately following the arrest of Beria was made a member of the Party's Central Committee.³⁸

CHANGES AT THE TOP.

There have been substantial changes in the distribution of power within the leadership of the Council of Ministers since the removal of Beria. The present position has been brought about in three steps. The first occurred in December, 1953, with the appointment of five new Deputy Premiers—Saburov, Pervukhin, Tevosyan, Malyshev and Kosygin—bringing the total number up to six.³⁹ All these had been Deputy Premiers under Stalin. There is no indication of any alteration to the formula of March, 1953, whereby membership of the Presidium was restricted to the Premier and the First Deputy Premiers, so at this time the Presidium still presumably consisted only of Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich. However, with the breaking up of the consolidated ministries, a renewed need was probably felt for a wider body, between the Presidium (now an "inner cabinet") and the full Council of Ministers, which by early 1954 had again become impossibly large as a committee. It therefore seems likely that from this time regular consultation between the Premier, First Deputy Premiers and Deputy Premiers (each responsible for a group of ministries)

32. Alexandrov, a candidate member of the Party Central Committee and a philosopher, came under fire by Zhdanov in 1947 for his book "History of Western European Philosophy."

33. *Pravda*, March 22, 1955.

34. *Ibid*, April 7, 1955.

35. *Ibid*, August 4, 1954.

36. Melnikov was Ukrainian Party Second Secretary under Khrushchev and succeeded the latter as First Secretary in 1949; Kozyulya was a member of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, and a vice-Premier before his transfer to Moscow.

37. *Pravda*, February 10, 1955.

38. See short biography in *Entsiklopedicheski slovar*, Vol. II, 1953, p. 618.

39. *Pravda*, December 22, 1953.

would be held, and thus the old "outer cabinet" was revived. Manipulation of this outer cabinet may have played an important part in subsequent manoeuvres against Malenkov.

The second and decisive step came 15 months later. In February, 1955, Malenkov was replaced as Premier by Bulganin, and became a Deputy Premier and Minister for Electric Power Stations.⁴⁰ This left a Presidium of three—Bulganin, Molotov and Kaganovich, plus seven Deputy Premiers.

Three weeks later, on March 1, 1955, came the third step. Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin were promoted to First Deputy Premiers, and thus joined the Presidium, and four new Deputy Premiers were created—Zavenyagin, Kucherenko, Lobanov and Khrunichev.⁴¹ This not only further reduced Malenkov's Government ranking (from number four to number seven) but also deflated the relative status of the old First Deputy Premiers, Kaganovich and Molotov.

Beneficiaries of the Khrushchev-Bulganin alliance now form a majority in both the "inner" and the "outer" cabinets, and head several of the key ministries. It must be assumed that the First Secretary and the Premier can therefore count on enjoying firm control over the Government at least for the time being. However, the present alignment may be no more permanent than those which preceded it. Behind the 14 top government leaders stand a variety of political, social and economic forces, each with interests and a logic of its own. The ever-changing patterns of interaction of these forces will constantly modify the day-to-day relationships between the present leaders. Failure of some element of foreign or domestic policy, the illness or death of one of the leaders, or a severe drought might then serve as the catalyst for a new power alignment in the Council of Ministers to crystallise.

40. *Pravda*, February 10, 1955.

41. *Ibid.*, March 1, 1955.

Review Article

America, Britain and Russia, Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-46*

by Fred Alexander

The third self-contained volume in the Wartime Series of Chatham House's invaluable *Survey of International Affairs* is a monumental tome on a topic of the highest contemporary as well as historical significance.

What Professor Toynbee asked his colleague from Chicago to do was to trace the history of the Grand Alliance as the instrument of the co-operation of the three Great Powers against a common enemy. In addition to the narrative form characteristic of the *Survey*, Professor McNeill was required to keep in mind throughout the impact (short term and long range) of this wartime co-operation upon the political, economic and administrative, as well as on the military, ideas and practices of each of the Allies. He was also set the task, as far as it was possible with the material available in 1952, to "fit the story of the Grand Alliance into the framework of world history." In all this, due regard had necessarily to be paid to the individual contributions of each of the three dominant personalities in the Alliance and of some at least of their collaborators inside and outside their respective countries.

Professor McNeill has brought the mass of published material on which his work has been based into a coherent and readable whole. The book proper is divided into three parts. The first 375 pages deal with co-operation to fight the war, from the entry of the United States in December 1941 down to the Cairo and Teheran conferences of November and December 1943, at which point Allied co-operation "could be and was founded upon agreement on military strategy." Part II, from December 1943 to February 1945, traces and analyses the co-operation from the last six months of the preparation for the invasion of Normandy down to and through the Yalta Conference. As peace began to loom, "co-operation became proportionately more difficult, conflicts clearer and less subject to compromise." The third part follows the breakdown of Allied co-operation during the period from the military events of Europe in February/May 1945, through the unexpectedly short victory campaign against Japan to the beginnings of the Cold War in

* *America, Britain and Russia, Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-46* by W. H. McNeill. R.I.I.A. Survey of International Affairs 1939-46; edited by Arnold Toynbee. Pp. xviii and 819. Maps. Price £A.4/15/. (O.U.P., 1953.)

April/December 1946. There is a short concluding chapter, with the rather misleading designation "Part IV," on "Reflections and General Observations." Two appendices, one of 20 pages on "Lend-Lease" by Sir David Waley, an excellent Index and three interesting world maps complete the massive volume.

Of the three parts of the narrative, the first impressed the present writer as the most stimulating, perhaps because this ground had not already been so badly ploughed up by partisan pens. The student of the origins of World War I will find in these early chapters some striking comparisons between the now well-known Anglo-French military staff conversations of the first decade of the century (the political implications of which Grey and others kept denying right down to August 1914) and the joint strategic plan known by the short title of ABC-1 which resulted from Anglo-American staff conversations in London and Washington as early as August 1940 and from "formal staff conferences" in Washington between January and March 1941. At these times not only was the United States at peace but it was by no means certain that the country would ever be at war.

"Actually, the document had no legally binding force. It was subject to confirmation by superior military and political authorities in both countries; and although the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy officially approved the plan the President never did so . . . Yet the very fact of such planning carried with it certain moral commitments and practical consequences. The U.S. army and navy governed themselves as though war with Germany impended, which meant, especially for the navy, action in accordance with ABC-1. Such actions made Anglo-American co-operation in the Atlantic so close that the transition to full-scale belligerency after December 7 made little immediate difference." (p.11.)

Equally significant is the fact that this joint planning at the official level extended from the strategic to the economic fields and the "interlacing of American and British officialdom on subordinate levels" became very close indeed—with the result, incidentally, that the larger experience of the British in shaping a war economy since 1939 greatly affected early wartime economic administration in the United States.

Three qualifications to the significance for the Grand Alliance as such of this prewar and early postwar strategic and economic co-operation are emphasised by Professor McNeill. In the first place intensive staff co-operation was confined to two partners only. In this respect Russia was, in effect, "only half an ally," and the channels of contact between the American and Russian Governments remained "relatively restricted." Secondly, the planned co-operation did not work out satisfactorily in the Pacific as it did across the Atlantic, notwithstanding the major Anglo-American differences there which are described in consider-

able detail in the middle section of the book. Thirdly, the effectiveness of American co-operation was, in Professor McNeill's view, seriously handicapped by U.S. inter-Service rivalries (e.g. MacArthur/Nimitz, pp.157-8; Stillwell, pp.161-2 and *passim*) and by the fact that American wartime diplomacy had been taken out of the hands of the Department of State. This might have been justified in part by the lack of fundamental change in the prewar attitude of mind of American diplomats, "men who were quite unaccustomed to the executive responsibilities involved in active diplomacy undertaken by a Great Power." (p.404.) It nevertheless produced "egregious instances of the failure of normal communication within the American Government, arising from Roosevelt's unwillingness to share high politics with the State Department" with resultant confusion within the American Government which must have seemed "almost incredible to the British" (p.424).

A much more serious obstacle to the ultimate success of joint Anglo-American achievement during the war is described by Professor McNeill as "the professional rigidity of the American tradition" that military decisions should be made on military grounds only regardless of political considerations. This the author presents as "perhaps the most pervasive difference between Americans and their allies" (p.30). The explanation recurs again and again throughout the book as, for example, when General Clark used Admiral Darlan in North Africa in November 1942 despite the "political smell" he brought with him from Vichy. Clark and his adviser Murphy "both seemed to feel that their decisions should properly be guided by purely military considerations" (p.253).

This cause of Anglo-American differences was sometimes offset by Roosevelt's intervention to override his military advisers, as in July 1942 after Churchill had compelled the American Chiefs of Staff to abandon the SLEDGEHAMMER offensive in Western Europe which they desired to launch in that year. The President's personal decision then prevented the diversion of American effort to the Pacific (p.194) and so made possible the offensive in North Africa, "TORCH," out of which was born a partnership which "reached downward from the highest levels of government and military administration to embrace the rank and file" and was "without precedent in history" (p.223).

On the other hand, Roosevelt's political idealism often tended to reinforce his military chiefs' desire to get on with the job of winning the war in Europe, regardless of the political consequences. The President had no sympathy with the political motives which the Americans attributed to Churchill in his desire for an earlier Mediterranean offensive prior to or as well as Normandy.

"The suspicion that British diplomatic skill might hoodwink the Americans into using their men and supplies to support and extend

British Empire and influence was constantly in the background of American strategic planning" (p.284).

Roosevelt carried into his close and cordial collaboration with Churchill strong personal views on the subject of imperialism in general and the British Empire in particular (pp.40-41). In the middle of his campaign planning he also "felt free to dream dreams of future peace, prosperity and democracy for all mankind" (p.19). He had moreover a naive belief that military victory would solve all major political problems in Europe. In this respect Professor McNeill regards Roosevelt as embodying a "Great Myth" which he persuaded many if not most Americans to believe in.

"The myth was an optimistic one. Roosevelt repeatedly said and apparently fully believed that, when once victory had been won and the forces of fascist aggression had been trodden into the dust, an era of international peace, prosperity, freedom, and justice could be inaugurated, and surely would be if men of goodwill strove manfully to that end" (p.760).

This emphasis upon the President's faith in the brave new world and the end of power politics does not lead Professor McNeill to minimise the skill, if not also the duplicity, of Churchill in his persistent efforts to bring the Americans round to his views on the importance of a Mediterranean offensive. He does however stress the immediate military as well as the ultimate political fears which influenced the Prime Minister prior to D Day. "OVERLORD," in Churchill's view, should be the final thrust against a weakened Germany, to be undertaken only when there was no fear of colossal waste of manpower through another Dunkirk or of the bogging down of large armies in fruitless and costly French warfare of the type which he remembered too well from World War I.

After D Day, however, when early successes inspired excessive optimism as to the impending collapse of Germany, Churchill's motives were primarily political—to forestall the Russians and to prevent the Bolshevising of Western and Central Europe. In this he still received no sympathy from either American military leaders or their President. Part III of the book makes clear that Roosevelt as well as his military advisers contemplated early withdrawal of American troops from Europe which should be left (and relied upon) to solve its own problems in the new era of international co-operation.

The President wished to be able to concentrate on the establishment of the new international machinery free from the neo-isolationist opposition in his own country which he feared if he kept American troops in, and continued to send American money to, Europe. Thus, despite his intimate relations with the British Prime Minister and the very closely knit Anglo-American war effort, Roosevelt often felt himself to be a somewhat detached (if not superior) arbiter between Stalin and Churchill.

Though the President's early confidence in his ability to secure the Russian leader's full co-operation through personal contact was to be shaken somewhat after his first meeting (p.82, n.3), Roosevelt came down on Stalin's side at Teheran in November 1943 partly because he suspected Churchill's military arguments as "mere rhetoric, designed to hide his real motives in a garb of plausible words" (p.366).

This American determination to separate military and political objectives in Europe during the actual fighting makes consistent the decisions of President Truman in 1945-46 to retreat from economic as well as political involvement in Europe by such acts as the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease on the surrender of Japan. Professor McNeill's readers have grown so accustomed to subsequent American political and economic activity in Europe against the Soviet Union that it is well that he should remind them that it was not until May 1946 that the United States returned to the "political economics" of the war years (Part III Ch. II Sect. ii (d)) and not until 1947 that "American opinion came round to support military and political action against Russian expansion" (pp.689-90). Incidentally, the slowness of American reaction to the realist yet ideological line of early postwar Soviet policy and the reluctance of U.S. officials to support Churchill against Stalin as late as March 1946 (p.658) help to explain the more highly emotive character of the American than the British response when the former did eventually come (p.660; see also p.689, n.1).

In his analyses of the views and conduct of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin which are scattered through the book, Professor McNeill is candid and at times penetrating. The strength as well as the weakness of American and British leadership are frankly stated. Some criticisms of Roosevelt have already been noted. One is made to feel that Churchill's intellectual nimbleness and verbal facility sometimes overreached themselves in his dealings with his American colleagues and evoked as much suspicion as respect. On the other hand, full justice is done to Churchill's recognition of the limitations of his own position *vis-a-vis* the mounting strength of his American partner (p.756) and to his ability to throw himself "with full vigour and enthusiasm" into an agreed operation, "even when he had resisted the original proposal with all his might" (p.755).

The portrait of Stalin which emerges is much less clear than that of either of his two partners for the very good reason that the author had available to him neither the wealth of written material (appreciative and otherwise) on both Roosevelt and Churchill nor the oral testimony of many of the subject's fellow countrymen. Stalin's public statements, his informal comments in the relaxed moments of convivial sessions at Big Three Conferences and the impressions of foreign observers are a poor substitute for the mass of material on the British and American leaders.

It is not surprising that Stalin emerges as "an enigma" who was "so two-faced" (because he was continually playing two roles, as revolutionary Marxist and Russian ruler respectively) "as to make it impossible even for himself to say which was the 'real' and which the 'false' front he presented to the world" (p.63).

The author's limitations in his appreciation of Stalin exemplify a basic weakness of the book as a whole. Whereas the interaction of the attitudes of Great Britain and the United States upon one another and upon the Grand Alliance are examined exhaustively, within the limits of material available in 1952, and far-reaching if not final judgments are passed on this evidence, what concerns Russia's contribution has often to be qualified by such statements as "One may perhaps guess, from the scanty evidence at hand, that the Russian high command . . ." (p.75). In the author's own words, " . . . one had to guess blindly what was real, what falsified or distorted; or, more prudently, leave the question open" (p.62).

Despite these admitted limitations, Professor McNeill brings forward some very interesting information and views on the Soviet's role in the Grand Alliance and the effect of the Alliance on the U.S.S.R. He confirms, for example, the persistent effect on British and American attitudes at late as 1941 and 1942 of the underestimate of the Soviet Union's powers of military resistance (pp.220-1) which dates back to the inaccurate information from British official sources in Moscow in 1938¹ and lasted until the break through at Stalingrad. He notes the complications for Allied strategy of "Russian willingness to suffer enormous losses with apparent equanimity" (p.86) and the consequential failure of Stalin to understand the "squeamishness" of British or American generals. Again, he notes that basic differences between the authoritarian regime in Russia and the governmental systems of Britain and America made detailed planning almost impossible except by the Big Three in person. Thus Stalin's inability or unwillingness to delegate authority, quite apart from the Russians' continued suspicion of, and reluctance to disclose vital information to, 'capitalist' governments, would have made impossible anything comparable with the very substantial degree of integration of the Anglo-American war effort. Fortunately, as Professor McNeill points out, Russia's continued state of peace with Japan until after V-E Day made in a sense unnecessary her membership of the Combined Chiefs-of-Staffs Committee which emerged from the Arcadia Conference of December 1941-January 1942. This glossed over what would probably have been the insuperable difficulty of Stalin's inability to delegate powers of strategic decision (pp.112, 118).

In general comment, therefore, a reviewer must recognise that while

1. See Harvest of Munich, review of *Survey of International Affairs 1938*, Vol. III, *The Australian Outlook*, Vol. 8, No. 3 September 1954, p.173.

Professor McNeill's analysis of the American and British viewpoints and actions is more penetrating and convincing than that of the Russian attitude, the story of the Soviet Union's contribution to the over-all strategy and the final victory is interpreted with as much vividness as possible. The author's general conclusion regarding the collaboration between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin is worth quoting:

"When one considers how fundamentally different Russian society and government were from those of Britain and America, how inimical the ideology of Marxist-Leninism was to co-operation with the West, and how divergent were the national interests of Russia from those of her Allies—when one considers all this, the wonder is not that co-operation soon broke down, but that it was possible for co-operation to become as effective as it was during the later war year. Restraint and compromise on both sides—not only on Roosevelt's and Churchill's but on Stalin's too—made possible what was achieved; but the principal architect of the Grand Alliance was not any Allied leader, but Hitler himself. When his sustaining hand was removed, the Alliance soon fell to the ground" (p.87).

The concluding sentence in this extract provides a convenient lead into Professor McNeill's "Reflections and General Observations," with which he concludes his work. Rejecting interpretations of the Grand Alliance which attribute either "Machiavellian conspiracy" or "open-hearted camaraderie" to the inner counsels of the Allies during the war he admits that much of the international machinery had, by 1945 and 1946, been "dismantled and replaced, if at all, by relatively ineffective bodies working under the United Nations." Nevertheless, despite his necessarily short time perspective in 1952, he proffers six stimulating comments in response to the "fascinating though particularly treacherous intellectual challenge" to fit the Alliance into the framework of world history.

The first is that the supra-national administration created by the Alliance, chiefly in the economic and military integration of the Anglo-American war effort, had "enduring significance," since it provided models for such postwar innovations as NATO and ECA.

Secondly, the Alliance rendered valuable service by, as it were, cushioning the decline of Great Britain as a world power. Under Churchill's guidance, and helped by his direct association with Roosevelt, a way was found whereby the hard fact of the material supremacy of the United States could be accepted without surrender of the British right to independence of view and action—up to the point where a dispute threatened continued administrative co-ordination between the two Governments which, at bottom, the British could not afford but the Americans could.

In the third place Professor McNeill accords the Alliance long range

significance in that it covered a "general transformation of the scale of world politics."

"In the largest sense the United States found herself after the World War II in Britain's traditional geopolitical position. North America might be considered as a great island lying against the world continent of Eurasia-Africa, just as in the smaller sense Britain was as island set against the land mass of continental Europe," while "the eclipse of Germany and France as great military Powers resulted in a shift of the centre of land power eastward into Russia." (pp.757-8).

The author's brief comment on the possible effects of this on the spirit of Europe provides one of the most penetrating passages in his book.

"From being prime movers in world politics, European nations had become pawns in someone else's game, and, with the change, some of the savour went out of life, some of the energy, enterprise, and derring-do which had distinguished European civilisation from its inception leaked away to be replaced by passivity and fear."

More controversial is the fifth reflection and observation. In Roosevelt's "Great Myth" and the emotive reaction of the American people in their disillusioned and reluctant, but nevertheless steady, acceptance of new international responsibilities Professor McNeill find a change which, while somewhat intangible, might eventually prove of the utmost importance. He links the "selfrighteousness and moral indignation" which "to a very significant degree" came to dominate postwar American foreign policy with the "ideals professed and proclaimed to all the world by the leading statesmen of the Grand Alliance." He believes that it is possible that these ideals might in the long run turn out to be "one of the most pregnant of all their actions" for, as he puts it, "wise men have said that myths as much as facts move mankind and govern human history" (pp.762-3).

Sixthly, Professor McNeill sees the Grand Alliance as continuing the work of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. By applying "conscious manipulation to social action," in order to produce its wartime achievements, the enduring changes it wrought, in the United States and in Soviet Russia no less than in the United Kingdom, could be viewed as aspects of "a great change in human thought and conduct which might be called the Social Revolution of the twentieth century" (p.763).

As the Grand Alliance was primarily concerned with the war in Europe, the Pacific and the war in Asia necessarily occupy less space in Professor McNeill's pages. The Australian reader may be disturbed by the infrequency with which his country receives a mention in the narrative unless he realised that this reflects the relatively small weight Australia

carried in the higher councils of the Alliance despite the exploits of her troops and the pressure of her politicians.

Some of the author's comments on the conduct of the war in the Pacific command attention. In accounting for the fact that in the Far East Allied co-operation was at best "a guttering flame," due weight is given to the ambitions of the U.S. Navy. "Some American admirals seemed to feel that the Japanese war was a private feud between Japan and the U.S. Navy and did not want third parties mixing in" (p.161). While the book does not concern itself directly with subsequent Republican charges that Roosevelt and Truman sold the pass to the Chinese Communists, the author's record of events in China down to early 1946 lends little support to these attacks. The United States Government is shown to have given more direct aid to Chiang in his domestic struggle in 1945 and early 1946 than the Chinese Communists received from the U.S.S.R. Indeed, Stalin is presented as having shown himself resigned in August 1944, May 1945 and December 1945 to Chiang's ultimate supremacy over his Communist rivals (p.710, n.2). The confused and hesitant state of U.S. policy in China by the end of 1946 is nevertheless recognised. (p.740). One very interesting comment on American war policy in the Pacific is that with the loss of air bases in China and the growing effectiveness of the U.S. sea and carrier-borne air offensive in the Pacific, from the summer of 1944 onwards, "American policy in China began more and more consciously to put political aims ahead of narrowly military considerations" (p.460). This from an American Government and Service Chief who continued to deny similar rights to Churchill in Europe!

While warmly appreciative of Professor McNeill's achievements, a reviewer may venture one or two mildly critical comments.

On the whole, the analysis is more impressive than the narrative. The "story" of the Alliance rarely grips the reader. This may be due partly to the very wide canvas and partly to the author's deliberate attempts to avoid *ex parte* presentation such as Chester Wilmot's much more readable *Struggle for Europe*. There is, however, a certain lack of flair such as enlivened many of Professor Toynbee's own inter-war volumes of the *Survey of International Affairs* or Professor W. K. Hancock's allied Chatham House publication, the *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, or even occasional passages in the more prosaic *British War Economy* of Hancock and Gowing—of which, incidentally, Professor McNeill has made very good use.

The style throughout the book nevertheless clear and readable with a striking phrase or patch of colour here and there. Examples noted were:—the reference on p.27 to the Washington cocktail party as "an institution which should find its place in any considered effort to describe the wartime working of the American Government"; the account of the

launching of the abortive 1942 American plan for SLEDGEHAMMER: "The day was April Fool's; so, as it turned out, was the plan" (p.172); the explanation of British acceptance of exclusion from Pacific decisions: "... indeed the British tended to regard assent to the demands made by U.S. navy as a sort of blackmail paid to keep Admiral King among the Allies" (p.222); the possible interpretation of Stalin's view of Roosevelt as "a strangely irrational representative of predatory capitalism or as an impenetrably devious agent of American imperialism" (p.327); the significance of the closer experience of governmental methods which came to many American businessmen in civilian war service: "The resultant courtship between the traditional leaders of American society—the businessmen—and the ageing New Deal might be described as one of the most important by-products of the war-time experience" (p.666, n.2); and, last but not least, the apt heading for events of January-April 1946, beginning with the first General Assembly of the United Nations, as "Open Quarrels, Openly Arrived At" (p.712).

One may perhaps also be forgiven for suspecting the editorial hand of Professor Toynbee, if not also his pen, at one or two places in the text. On p.67, n.1, for example, the attitudes of Latin-Americans to the United States and of Scots and Irish to England are compared with the "curious mixture of attraction and repulsion, of imitation and rejection, of admiration and dislike" which marked Russia's attitude to Western Europe since the days of Ivan the Terrible. Again, on pp.432-3, the 1944 crisis in Polish affairs is given a place in the history of World War II "like that which Thucydides gave to the Athenian attack on Melos."

The frequent use made of footnotes for matter of substance which should be in the text is regrettable, though it may be partly the result of Chatham House and other discussions after the book was in proof. It does not lessen the reader's irritation at such distractions when the footnote happens to contain a very penetrating or challenging analysis. One regrets, too, the absence of a bibliography. Though the book is admittedly based "wholly upon published material," it is somewhat irritating to have to hunt back to the first footnote reference to a work cited to obtain full detail of its author, title and publisher.

The itemised Index is most helpful and the text commendably free from printer's errors of which one only was noted: "acceted the proposal pwillingly" on p.543, 1.20.

One criticism in point of content is the query whether an English author might not have found more grounds for constructive criticism of the British contribution to the Alliance to match the many candid and stimulating comments which this American writer has to make upon his own countrymen, their institutions and their policies, as they faced the greatest challenge in their history.

A First Survey Of Hitler's Europe*

By E. Bramsted.

Ten years after the collapse of National Socialist control of Europe, Chatham House offers us a first survey of its political and economic system and of its impact on individual countries ranging from the Netherlands to the Ukraine and from Norway and Denmark to the Balkan States. We are given both a volume of raw material for the historian's task, in form of a collection of important documents from this period, and a survey which attempts to establish and interpret the complex events and trends in the Third Reich and in the countries under its domination. Whereas the documents were selected by one person, the six parts of the Survey—discussing the overall political and economic structure of the Hitlerian rule, the position in France, in Italy, in the smaller occupied countries in Eastern Europe and in the occupied and satellite countries in Eastern Europe—were assigned to a dozen people.

The result is a volume containing a mine of information, but rather uneven in value and lacking in proportion. No explanation is given to the reader of why Italy is dealt with in fifty-four pages and France in one hundred and thirty-five (of which the larger part treats Vichy France and the smaller one the Free French Movement, 1940-42), whilst the events and developments in the whole of Eastern Europe are pressed altogether into one hundred and forty pages. Such an important section of it as the history of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria is confined to a mere twenty-seven pages. It is, of course, likely that the writers on Eastern Europe were unable to draw on the wealth of materials available for the story of the Nazi regime in Germany or some of the Western countries, but then this should have been stated by the Editors. One might sometimes even doubt if such a survey is not somewhat premature, with so many important collections of official documents such as the *Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, 1937-1945* still incomplete and highly relevant memoirs of leading political actors, for instance those by M. Miklos Kallay, the Hungarian war-time Premier, appearing only now after publication of the Survey. Some parts of the chapter on Belgium are bound to prove rather sketchy and thin, once certain very revealing documents on conversations between Hitler and King Leopold of Belgium in 1940-41, which the present reviewer has seen, have been published. The same may be true of German policy towards the Scandinavian States.

The editors would probably reply that it is better to come out with an incomplete Survey than to have none at all. We should indeed be

**Survey Of International Affairs, 1939-46. Hitler's Europe.* Edited by Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee. Oxford University Press, London, 1954. A.90s 9d.

Documents On International Affairs, 1939-1946. Volume II. Hitler's Europe. Selected and edited by Margaret Carlyle. Oxford University Press, London, 1954. A.63s.

grateful for some of the aspects and insights we gain from this volume, notably so from the concise and factual parts on the political and economic structure of Hitler's New Order, contributed by Mr. Clifton J. Child and Miss Patricia Harvey, or for Professor Cobban's lucid and penetrating account of the complexities of Vichy France. But it is a great pity that some of the other contributors do not seem to have fully familiarised themselves with significant material or studies in foreign languages available at the time of writing. In the chapter on Finland e.g., no reference is made to *Les Memoires du Marechal Mannerheim, 1882-1946* (Paris, 1952). This book contains, *inter alia*, the text of an important letter from the Marshal to Hitler on September 2, 1944, in which Mannerheim, who had just been made Prime Minister of Finland, informed the Fuhrer that Finland was about to quit the war. Whereas the chapters on Germany, France and Italy are based on a wealth of material in the languages of these countries, it is disappointing to discover that the section on the Netherlands by Viscount Chilton ignores the excellent research work done since 1945 by the *Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie* in Amsterdam.

The edition by that Institute of the trials of the Dutch National Socialist leader A. Mussert and of the high German functionaries Rauter and Christiansen have been overlooked. A simple inadequate footnote (on p.508) refers to the existence of the Dutch underground Press, though three years ago the aforementioned Institute published a very instructive anthology from that Press even giving brief summaries of them in English after printing the full text in Dutch (*Het Woord als Wapon. Keur uit de Nederlandse Ondergrounds Pers 1940-1945*. The Hague, 1952). The following remarks in the Introduction to the Dutch book, which would seem to apply not only to Holland, might well have been considered with profit for the purposes of the Survey: "The underground papers however welcome, were never wholly appreciated by the majority of the people; on the other hand they were an object of veneration to those Dutchmen who lived in the free world. Many of them only realised after their return to liberated Holland that life under the Germans was more complicated than one had been led to believe from reading the underground papers. 'Similarly it would have been impossible to derive the social reality of ancient Israel from the Books of the Prophets'".

It was an advantage the Dutch resistance movement enjoyed when compared with the French *resistance* that during the war the Dutch "achieved a hitherto unparalleled degree of prestige and influence in the Netherlands." The Dutch Queen in exile had never any rival inside her country as General de Gaulle in London had in Marshal Petain and his Ministers in Vichy. There is conclusive evidence of the fidelity of the legality of her Government in exile with her. On the other hand the chapters on France show how deeply this country was split, though at

least in the first two or three years Marshal Petain enjoyed a prestige difficult to explain in rational terms. "I do not understand the Marshal," declared Leon Blum at the Petain trial after the war, "there is a mystery in him which I cannot penetrate." Vain, secretive and not very bright, as he was, that old man would not have remained four years in office had he not fulfilled a sociological function, both from the German and the French points of view. "The truth is," states Dr. Cobban, "that the average Frenchman needed someone to believe in, to cling to in the hour of total defeat while the individuals and groups who hoped to capitalise the defeats to the advantage of their ideas or their personal ambitions needed a figure-head" (p. 351).

If Vichy had no clear-cut policy, except to keep France out of the remainder of the war, it certainly had an ideology, provided by the spirit of the *Action Francaise* rather than by that of National Socialism. Petainism was an authoritarian conservatism, anti-liberal, anti-collectivist, anti-parliamentarian and Anglophobe. The pathetic figure of Petain will long be debated by Frenchmen and by historians, but it is worth noting that Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt's envoy in Vichy, 1941-42, thought that the Marshal had a genuine concern for the welfare and protection of the French people. In that he differed from Pierre Laval, a man without principles, led by self-interest plus a strong hatred of the British and the conviction that a German victory was inevitable. To the Germans Laval was invaluable, "the real guarantee of the subservience of Vichy to Germany," and they were therefore only too willing to restore him to power as Head of the Government in April, 1942, sixteen months after the Marshal had suddenly brought Laval's earlier spell as Foreign Minister to a close.

What is perhaps most illuminating in the story of an unhappy country is the rivalry between the more moderate Petainists in Vichy (unoccupied with the rest of that Zone until November, 1942) and the extreme French collaborators in occupied Paris, shrill men like Doriot and Deat and the brutally efficient Darnand, a group which was only able to worm its way into the Vichy Cabinet in January, 1944. But this group cut little ice with the French masses, though it contributed much to the tragic fate of thousands of French Jews. Always afraid that after the war a right-wing France might take the place of Italy as a junior partner in Hitler's Axis, the astute Count Ciano was not so wrong when in May, 1941, he described as the only difference between Paris and Vichy that in Paris people were saying "Let us hope the British win," while at Vichy they were saying "Let us hope those British swine win."

In this book new light is thrown on the attitudes of the heads of some other satellite states towards Berlin and Hitler. The Fuhrer had a certain respect for Marshal Antonescu, the Rumanian "Conducator." This did

not prevent him from taunting the Rumanian at a meeting in April, 1943, because Antonescu still allowed the leader of the peasant opposition party, Maniu, personal freedom and even some political scope. "I killed my political opponents," Hitler advised Antonescu, who, it seems, coolly replied, "I did not." In Hungary, Admiral Horthy, though not the shrewdest of rulers, contracted Hitler's displeasure by his dislike of the extreme anti-Semitic measures (his wife was of Jewish origin) and later because the Fuhrer learned of Premier Kallay's secret contacts with the Western Powers. There is a certain parallel in the treatment Hitler meted out to Admiral Horthy in March, 1944, with that given to the President of the rump Czech State in March, 1939. In both cases the head of a helpless neighbouring state was forced to go to Germany, to be harangued by Hitler, whilst German troops meantime occupied the unfortunate man's country. But Horthy showed more spirit than Hacha had done. He protested indignantly to Hitler, walked out on him and called for his special train to take him back to Hungary. He even tried six months later, with Germans all over his country, to arrange for a Hungarian armistice with the Russians.

Unfortunately, Professor Toynbee's disappointing introduction does little towards an analysis of the overall problems and an integration of the findings of the various authors. Before imagining "one of the historic master-empire builders standing in Hitler's shoes on the morrow of the fall of France"—Augustus or Han Liu Pang or Cyrus are cited—it seems more profitable to ask how Hitler and his divided entourage of party bosses were able to get as far as they did, and why they managed to keep control of most of Europe for four years. Their uncanny instinct for playing off one group against another in occupied and satellite countries helped them to some extent. Military and technological efficiency, control of radio and propaganda, contributed much, and the role of the *furor Teutonicus* of which Heinrich Heine had already warned the indulgent French a hundred years earlier, should not be minimised. But were the Nazis really as good organisers as they were credited to be during the war even on the Allied side? The evidence of the valuable chapter on "Labour" by Patricia Harvey points to an answer in the negative.

There was a sharp deterioration of the German labour position from the winter of 1941-42 onward which led Hitler to extend a compulsory labour service from the Eastern to the Western occupied countries. The brutal treatment of foreign labour under Sauckel increased the resentment of the satellites and the defeated enemies alike and did nothing to fulfil the expectation of a steep rise in German armament production. The Nazi ideology of the racial superiority of the Germanic nations affected adversely nearly every aspect of the German treatment of foreign labour. Grim methods of recruitment, working and living conditions were anything but an incentive to a maximum production. As Himmler once put it bluntly

at a meeting of high SS officers, "Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only so far as we need them as slaves for our *Kultur*; otherwise it is of no interest to me." No wonder that even the harsh use of prisoners-of-war for war-work—contrary to the rule of the Geneva convention of 1929—and the working to death of innumerable inmates of the concentration camps did not redress the balance.

The companion volume of *Documents* contains a number of Hitler Decrees and Sauckel Orders on the employment of foreign labour in the section "Germany: Economic" which follows one on "Germany: Political." There are also translations of Hitler's famous Directive No. 21 for the Invasion of Russia, "Operation Barbarossa" of December 18, 1940, and of his ruthless "Night and Fog" decree on the Punishment of Crimes against the Occupying Power, of December 7, 1941.

The arrangement of about 200 printed documents follows closely the pattern of the *Survey*. All countries discussed there are documented here. In addition there are however, also brief sections of documents on "Germany and Russia" and "Germany and Japan." Most of the copious material on Vichy France and on the Free French Movement is in the original French. Apart from this the reader is furnished with translations, on the whole well done.

Though each volume has a detailed and useful index, it would have gained by the addition of a chronological table, synchronising the events in the various countries. The *Survey* has four maps of which however only one depicts Europe, showing the position of Hitler's rule at its peak in autumn 1942. One would have welcomed more maps of that type instead of the bird's eye world maps provided. To understand the relevance of the latter has proved in two cases beyond the capacity of the present reviewer.

Notes

THE SOUTH PACIFIC RESEARCH COUNCIL MEETING, by Nancy Robson.

*Whereas though Europe founder likewise
Too close acquaintance leaves us blind
Who by aloofness, by selection,
Have written off what looms behind
The fragile fences of our mind,
Have written off the flood, the jungle.
... Still less can see
How in this earlier century
Dark children daub the skies with arson.*

—Louis MacNeice, *Letter from India*.

To overleap the age of arson and reach intact the reality of harmonious co-existence in the then well-named ocean—this is the Pacific vision that in defiance of the cynics has animated the work of the South Pacific Commission since its inception in 1947.

It has been said, and it is true, that the Commission was born in a moment of postwar idealism; but it is true also that recognition of the need to cushion culture contact in Pacific islands, and the belief that through international collaboration this cushioning can best be achieved, takes excellent account of the harsh incendiary realities of the world.

The vision is of the hundreds of ravishing islands and atolls of the South Pacific lit no longer by the arc-light of romantic fiction, but by the benign reality of social harmony as members of a vast ocean community. Extremely rapid postwar advance of culture contact in many islands confirms the inevitability of their situation within the monstrous interlocking complex of the world. The anachronism of Shangri-la is proclaimed. And within the strong warning of other conflagrations, some teaching and guidance are to be found.

The South Pacific Commission is working on a solid programme of basic social and economic research—designated with pleasing simplicity the "Work Programme." This has been operating now for six years or so, with an overall list of forty projects in the health, economic and social fields, and priority action concentrated at present on seventeen of them. While it is the Commissioners—speaking, at their annual session in October, for the governments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States—who decide the precise scope of the coming year's activity, its scientific and technical aspects are worked out by the South Pacific Research Council. This Council held its annual meeting in June-July, at SPC headquarters in Noumea. I attended it, as every now and again I have had the good fortune to do.

In the Cook islands once I saw islanders sitting in the lee of a cane hut, working on some communal task of weaving. Long interplaying flexible strands of yarn flowed forward rhythmically over their hands, individually guided and corrected for a concerted purpose, in an atmosphere of friendly sociability hardly ruffled by an occasional deep grunt or murmur. The Research Council, as it moves the Work Programme forward year by year, resembles this human loom; and its material, although disguised in documents and statistics and a multiplicity of words, is eminently human too.

It has, in fact, the formidable task of identifying and helping to release the springs of welfare and progress for over three million islanders, extraordinarily diverse in culture, experience and physical condition. The Commission is tackling this task at ground level: how to raise nutritional standards, to teach the elementary practices essential to hygiene, to fill the dangerous void of literature suited to newly literate adults. On these and many other problems common to the mass of South Pacific territories, the Commission's Work Programme provides governments with valuable tools.

Economic questions of exploiting fisheries resources, introducing new crops to islands over-dependent on the coconut, waging war against diseases and pests that attack essential crops—these too are now tackled on a region-wide basis.

Many activities cut across the convenient Research Council division into health, economic and social development committees: these are examined by the Council as a whole.

Most of the men on the Council—there are no women: a fact commented on with raised eyebrows by Professor Spate, who attended as observer for the Australian National University—have a long experience of the Pacific, and number many islanders among their friends. They are doctors, anthropologists, agriculturalists, economists and educators. Many are at the head of these various services in their territories. Their approach to island problems takes practical realities fully into account.

International observers also attended the meeting this year for the first time. Besides the National University, UNESCO, WHO and FAO sent representatives, who took part in discussions but did not vote. All contributed wide experience and sympathetic objectivity. Dr. Miles, secretary of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council of the FAO in Bangkok, was able also to contribute at practical level by entering into arrangements for a fisheries training school for islanders, to be held in Noumea next year under joint auspices of the SPC and FAO.

Observers were cooperative also in the all too rare moments when the Council laid aside its earnest work and relaxed. (I can only remember this happening once, although surely this is too austere to be true.) Dr. Dy, WHO malariologist from the Philippines, danced a memorable rumba—the Friday night crowd at the Biarritz stopped dancing, the French barman performed prodigies with le pick-up. Someone even managed a spotlight. Below the balcony, waves slid in susurrant from the reef . . .

(There was another night. Three hardy internationals drank coffee on a platform precariously balanced in a banyan tree. Probably neither the conversation nor the third chair was quite what le patron had had in mind.)

Despite these pleasant moments of conviviality, my dominant impression on looking back is of the extreme sobriety (not merely in the bacchic sense—that, too) of the temper of deliberations. It was a meeting of men whose minds are all deeply engaged in the formidable challenging tasks of the islands. This preoccupation had gathered them together from America, Asia and Europe, and from north, south, east and west of the Pacific. Their intense preoccupation was with practical results. For the islands exert upon the mind an ancient magic that springs not from any romantic charm of landscape or dream of escape, but precisely from the reverse, from the absorbing complexity of the human task they present. The Commission's work offers a positive contribution towards it; and since the ultimate aim of its work is necessarily a long-range one, it is heartening that elements in the world situation might seem at present incredibly to presage the dawning—ininitely more explosive in the mind than the detonations it would frustrate—of an era appreciative of the pacific viewpoint. Auden evokes it:

And mingling with the distant mutter of guerilla fighting,
The voice of Man: *O teach me to outgrow my madness.*

*It's better to be sane than mad, or liked than dreaded;
It's better to sit down to nice meals than to nasty;
It's better to sleep two than single; it's better to be happy.*

*Clear from the head the masses of impressive rubbish;
Rally the lost and trembling forces of the will,
Gather them up and let them loose upon the earth,*

*Till they construct at last, a human justice,
The contribution of our star, within the shadow
Of which uplifting, loving and constraining power
All other reasons may rejoice and operate.*

Communism In Burma

By G. F. Fairbairn.

It is proposed in this article to examine certain highly important assertions concerning Burmese affairs, which were made by Professor C. P. Fitzgerald in his data paper prepared for the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference held last year in Kyoto. But it seems desirable first to draw attention to some of the errors of fact which elsewhere nicely assist the drift of the professor's argument. For instance, it is asserted that "the Chifley Government was only restrained from following the British example and recognising China by the imminence of the general election of 1949 . . ." This would be quite convincing but for the facts: the election was held on December 10 and British recognition was accorded on January 6, 1950. Again it is contended that the Liberal-Country Party Government wished to recognise Communist China "when the ardours of the election campaign—fought on the anti-Communist issue—had somewhat cooled off." However, a specialist gives a rather more full account of this election: "the Communist issue was important, though perhaps less important than banking policy, nationalisation, and the cost of living." Again, the Vietminh is described as a "national movement led by a Communist." Now the Vietminh itself has for some time been quite happy to describe itself as something very different from this; therefore such a description as given by Professor Fitzgerald bespeaks an ignorance of his subject, or a wilful disregard for the facts, very unusual in I.P.R. data papers.

But it is towards the end of this paper that the most flagrant disregard of the facts occurs; and on a point of vital importance to the argument. Professor Fitzgerald contends that Chinese policy in South-East Asia is not directed towards the spreading of Communism in the area. Chinese policy is rather, so the argument runs, directed towards the establishment of a ring of "friendly independent states, not necessarily (sic) under Communist regimes, but wholly free from entanglement in the cold war." As evidence of this contention he points to events in Burma which, it is admitted, has met all the Chinese requirements. Because Burma does meet these requirements, Professor Fitzgerald contends, China has not intervened in Burmese affairs despite provocation and despite having the same opportunity to assist the Burma Communist Party as it had opportunity to assist the Vietminh.

Thus an analogy is drawn between the position which obtained in Viet-Nam and that which obtained in Burma. This article will attempt to show that this analogy is entirely spurious, in that it entirely ignores readily ascertainable truths and relies upon ascertainable untruths. As a result, the argument that China's policy in South-East Asia is not concerned with the spread of Communism will collapse, so far as the evidence submitted by Professor Fitzgerald is concerned.

Within a short time of the Chinese Red Army reaching China's southern border, the Vietminh had securely established itself along that border; held a "liberated zone" in the border area and occupied frontier supply bases such as Langson and Caobang. It was already engaged in large-scale guerilla operations against the French and the most vital area of these operations was close to the Chinese border.

In Burma, on the other hand, the Burma Communist Party has never controlled a "liberated area" on, or even near, the Sino-Burmese border. It has never looked like holding a single frontier town which could serve as a supply base. In fact its main areas of concentration were until recently in the Pyinmana and Pakokku districts. Pyinmana is some 380 miles from the border. It is only recently (1954) that the Burma Communist Party (B.C.P.) began to leave Central and North-Central Burma and move some of its forces to the frontier area, doubtless in the hope of establishing conditions somewhat similar to those which prevailed in Viet-Nam. But this movement was only proceeding at the time of Professor Fitzgerald's article and even to-day has not yet proved successful.

It seems necessary briefly to outline what in fact has been the strategy of the B.C.P. The B.C.P. was expelled from the wartime "resistance" coalition, the Anti-

Fascist People's Freedom League, in 1947 and early in 1948 it went underground and commenced guerilla warfare, acting on instructions brought back from the March, 1948, Communist conference in Calcutta. Its chief aim would seem to have been the control of the vital Rangoon-Mandalay railway and the establishment of a "liberated zone" in the Pyinmana area. The same initial aim marked the Malayan and Indonesian Communist insurrections of that year. Other tactical operations of a political nature were attempted, such as the formation of a Popular Democratic front of all anti-government elements and a Triple Alliance with the Trotskyite and People's Volunteer Organisation insurrectionists, but these were not successful. With the advent of the Korean War the B.C.P., apparently seeing itself as a defender of China's southern border in the event of the war spreading, set up an advanced operational base in the Katha-Pinlebu area of the Kachin State in the far north. This was to have been the preliminary to a large-scale movement of B.C.P. forces to this district, in order to attain a short, safe supply line in remote territory along which it could obtain Chinese supplies. But this plan proved abortive because of the ending of Korean hostilities.

In 1952 and 1953 the Burmese Army inflicted very severe defeats on the B.C.P. in Central Burma and drove it west across the Irrawaddy. After the Government's April, 1952, Pyinmana offensive, the B.C.P. called for an armistice, but its appeal was rejected. By the middle of 1954 the B.C.P. was in sore straits. It had obviously lost the political and economic struggle for the allegiance of the peasantry. Therefore, the slogan (now well known in Asia) was revived: The establishment of the People's Army is the first essential; the People's Army is the decisive factor. To this end military men were placed on every B.C.P. committee. In August the B.C.P. announced that henceforth it would be divided into only two categories: the People's Militia, which would remain behind to wage guerilla warfare in evacuated areas, and the regular army, which would be drawn up in orthodox formations.

Now such a strategy inevitably requires a "liberated zone" and arms and aid from outside. Such was the now classic Vietminh strategy. Reports of the movement of B.C.P. troops north to the Katha-Pinlebu area, where geographical factors suggested a "little Yenan" was possible, were confirmed by a military operation carried out in that area in July by the 12th Burma Regiment. This was described as the most effective anti-Communist strike since "Operation Liberator" which inflicted defeat upon the B.C.P. in Central Burma. The point is: it was not until early 1954 that a series of defeats and B.C.P. tactical considerations resulted in the decision to move into an area where, for the first time throughout the insurrections, it might receive aid from China; and secondly, that within a short time after his decision, the Burmese Army was effectively harrying this venture. The point need not be laboured: the B.C.P. simply has not occupied a strategic situation even remotely analogous to that of the Vietminh vis-a-vis China.

However, certain points should be made further to clarify this issue which is so important to Professor Fitzgerald's contention about China's correct policy in South-East Asia. In Viet-Nam, the distance from the frontier post of, say, Langson to Hanoi itself is only about 80 miles as the peace dove flies and about 120 miles by Molotova truck; from Laokay to the delta about 170 miles. Not only were the Vietminh able to draw on virtually limitless numbers of labourers (impoverished and politically conscious at that), but the terrain enabled these coolie armies to move virtually undetectable from the air. In Burma, until recently at any rate, the B.C.P. would have had to recruit labourers from the sparsely populated, racially dissimilar Kachin or Shan States, where land is so abundant that people virtually do not bother to own any—scarcely a suitable area for the recruitment of willing porters. In addition, as has been remarked before, supplies would have to have been carried as far as 400 miles across territory most of which the B.C.P. has never looked like controlling or even influencing. The similarity with Viet-Nam does not exist; to suggest it exists is preposterous—but vital to Professor Fitzgerald's theme.

As there is no military analogy, so there is no political analogy. In Viet-Nam, though the Vietminh was led and controlled by Communists, and was a self-admitted instrument of world Communism, it could nevertheless call upon anti-French and

nationalist feeling. This it did with great success. And even when it could not call on active support, it could in many, if not most, cases safely assume that those who were not prepared actively to assist it were equally unprepared to oppose it by supporting the French. In Burma the situation (that is, the actual internal situation, not China's assessment of it) was entirely different. Though Chinese Communist leaders often called Burma a semi-colony—because it was not a Communist state—the fact remained that the B.C.P. could make no appeal whatsoever to anti-colonial or nationalist sentiment. Moreover, whereas the free Asian governments, and in particular India, were not prepared to recognise the Bao Dai regime in Viet-Nam, they were more than happy to recognise the Government of the Union of Burma. Therefore, China well knew that intervention on the Viet-Nam scale in Burma would have been regarded by India and other Asian nations in quite a different light.

It remains only to consider two statements also made by Professor Fitzgerald in support of his thesis. The first is that "in Burma the Government exercises hardly any authority over the region bordering on China." Now it is obvious from what has been pointed out in this article so far that this statement is not strictly relevant, because the Burmese Communists have not attempted to operate on a large scale in that area. But it is perhaps worthwhile to point out that, in the opinion of this writer who observed the affairs of a fair amount of this area in February, 1954, this statement is far from being true. The complaint in the Shan State, and on the southern border of the Kachin State, was rather that the continued presence of the Burmese Army and the semi-military U.M.P. threatened to upset the free and orderly progress of civilian rule, so ubiquitous were the central Government forces. This view was reinforced by the findings of a highly qualified observer who was in the North Shan States in December, 1954, and January-February, 1955. Apart from auxiliaries, there is an infantry brigade in the Kachin State and an infantry brigade in the Shan State, which is a much larger armed force than the B.C.P. could command throughout Burma.

Secondly, Professor Fitzgerald states that "Burma could not resist her Communists if they were stiffened by Chinese aid." Why not? At the time he was writing, the B.C.P. had some 2,500 guerillas; the Burmese Army was deploying eleven infantry brigades against the various insurrections and for garrison duty at important points. It is extraordinarily difficult to see why Burma—equally capable of obtaining extra arms and supplies from outside her borders—could not have adequately coped with a B.C.P. armed by China.

But if the opportunity for a Viet-Nam type of intervention in Burmese affairs did not exist, opportunities for another type of intervention did and do exist. And what evidence there is appears to suggest that China has availed herself of the opportunities offered. For instance, the Shans of Burma (Shan Thai) have been invited in devious ways to join with their Shan cousins who live in Yunnan Province, and with the Thais of Siam and Laos, to form a "Free Thai State." Similarly the Kachins have been invited to join their brothers (who live astride the South China border from the Mekong to the Brahmaputra) in a "Free Kachin State." Surely this is an attempt to subvert the allegiance of the Kachins and Shans to the Union of Burma; surely, also, these people are not involved in the "Cold War" and do not threaten China.

It seems necessary to state some of the day-to-day reports which many Burmese clearly have regarded as evidence of Chinese subversion. On February 11, 1954, the Rangoon "Nation" reported that certain B.C.P. leaders whose names were given had crossed into Yunnan. Their military escort who returned to Burma were provided with uniforms, arms and equipment by the Chinese. This report was confirmed on March 10 by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. He added that the Communists in question had crossed into Yunnan to receive fresh directives after their failures in Central Burma. On May 24, 1954, the "Nation" reported that Thakin Than Thun, the leader of the B.C.P., was moving north as a result of defections and defeat to set up communications with China.

During the same period the "Nation" reported (on February 28, 1954) that the Kachin National Defence Force (known as the P.N.D.F.) raised to "liberate" the Kachin State from Burmese rule, was based on the northernmost B.C.P. advanced

headquarters and would be directed only by Kachins trained in Yunnan. This suggests a clear link between the B.C.P., Kachin dissidents trained in Yunnan, and China itself. Moreover, on May 24 the "Nation" reported that there was a permanent liaison officer from the Assamese Communist Party stationed at this headquarters. It is therefore not surprising that on the same day U Kyaw Nyein, the Socialist Minister for Industry, saw fit to brand the Soviet "neo-imperialism" as a greater danger than the old type of imperialism. In this context it is significant that on September 10 it was announced that the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party, an overtly Communist but legal organisation, would extend its activities to the Shan and Kachin States.

It is not suggested that the evidence, only part of which has been included in this article, proves that China has embarked on large-scale subversion in Burma. It is hoped that the writer has made it clear that that is not the purpose of the article. But it is quite obvious that any interference or irredentist blandishments on the part of China can only be motivated by a desire to spread Communism in Burma. Therefore, it was considered fitting to point out that, even in the absence of opportunity for effective support being given to the Burma Communist Party, what support to anti-Government insurrectionists could be given, has been given.

China may be an inoffensive, unaggressive nation uninterested in assisting the spread of Communism. Perhaps the North Koreans launched out on war without Chinese knowledge and consent. Perhaps aid was given on a lavish scale to the Vietminh not because they were a Communist movement, but because France was a threat to China. Perhaps Thailand and Laos are sufficient threat, or insufficiently independent, to justify the pressure exerted through the "Free Thai Movement" and the use of a former Premier to subvert the natural allegiance of Siamese citizens. But the attempt to prove this thesis by asserting the action, or lack of action, of the Chinese Government vis-a-vis the Burma Communist Party, as Professor Fitzgerald has done, is bound to founder on the rocks of hard cold facts—of which he is ignorant or which he has chosen to ignore. This sort of special pleading does nothing to clarify the highly important issue of Chinese foreign policy.

Reviews

**"MUST WE LOSE AFRICA?" by Colin Legum. (Allen, London)
pp. 264: 16/ stg.**

Mr. Colin Legum was brought up in South Africa and is now the African Affairs correspondent of the "Observer," perhaps Britain's most influential Sunday newspaper. Therefore what he has to say concerning Africa and its complex problems deserves attention and thought.

In "Must We Lose Africa?" Mr. Legum moves from a particular problem—the banishment of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda in Uganda—to the general problem of the future of Africa. (A more apposite example might have been the exile of Seretse Khama. Mr. Legum mentions this problem in passing and says "Because South Africa objects to mixed marriages, Britain obliges by kicking Seretse Khama out of Bechuanaland." In the circumstances of that exile may be seen the stark tragedy of modern black and white Africa, and particularly Africa as it touches and is touched by a multi-racial Commonwealth.) Mr. Legum marshals his arguments well and from these draws logical but challenging conclusions. At the same time "Must We Lose Africa?" is well within the scope of the average reader. The many excellently produced and interestingly contrasted photographs demonstrate the many-sided life of Africa to-day.

The first half of the book is devoted to a searching examination of the events which led up to the banishment without trial of the Kabaka. There can be no doubt that Mr. Legum's sympathy is with the Kabaka and with the people of Buganda. He sums up the situation: The Governor "insisted that the Kabaka, contrary to his own conscience, should commend the Governor's policy. It was the Kabaka's refusal to act against his conscience that resulted in the decision to depose and banish him . . . He preferred banishment by the British Government to risking deposition by the people of Buganda . . . Does the danger not lie in the fact that the people of Buganda feel that their traditions, their strength and security (embodied in the Kabaka) have been banished by a foreign power?" Mr. Legum poses the question in very English terms: "Perhaps we can best put ourselves in the position of the people of Buganda by imagining what we should have done had the abdication of King Edward VIII, been forced on the British people by, say, the Americans, because, perhaps, they had objected to the draft of the King's address." He could have drawn the parallel even closer by pointing out that if the Buganda pattern had been followed it would have meant no British monarch until the death of the present Duke of Windsor. The Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, personally selected by Mr. Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary of the British Labour Government, is put under the microscope—and a likable man is seen. But, assuming that Mr. Legum's assessments are correct, the question must be asked: Does he represent the best type of Governor for modern conditions? Mr. Legum says: "His (Sir Andrew's) outstanding characteristic is masterfulness. He enjoys dominating every situation." Yet in fairness to Sir Andrew, it should be pointed out that most other reports testify to his **strength of character**—a very different, and much more acceptable trait than is masterfulness.

As Mr. Legum moves into the continent of Africa he takes us North, South, East and West, and in every direction problems loom. To the East there is the Maelstrom of Kenya. To the West is the Gold Coast, which Mr. Legum sees as a possible prototype of African nationhood; although he does not minimise the inevitable conflict of ideas when the Gold Coast, against South African opposition, applies for dominion status. To the South the Whitehall-imposed Central African Federation is tortuously creeping towards acceptance by the Africans; farther South lies the boiling cauldron of South African racialism. To the North runs the River Nile carrying the means of life to Sudan and Egypt and which, if the Lake Victoria schemes come to fruition, may yet transform living conditions in these countries.

Mr. Legum does well to remind us of the problems involved in relinquishing

British rule over the colonies: "When the time comes to transfer power in any of its colonies, Britain—try as it may—has no alternative but to place responsibility in the hands of a minority. It may be the whites who form the minority (as in South Africa and Central Africa), or it may be the African elites (as in the Sudan, the Gold Coast and Nigeria). For it is only these two minority groups and the Asians who are capable of political organisations and of filling posts in Western institutions. And however many reservations and guarantees may be provided by constitutions to protest the position of the mass of non-literates (non-literate, that is, in the language and ways of the West)—once political power has been vested in the hands of the politically dominant group, there is little that can consequently be done by the imperial power to prevent their pursuing their own policies."

In this readable book Mr. Legum puts forward a number of concrete proposals for assisting Africa—and Britain—to solve its problems. The most controversial of these proposals is: "The multi-racial societies—or those still under Whitehall's rule—must be firmly taught that there can be no question of self-government before the local inhabitants of all races are willing to establish social, economic or political institutions providing equality of opportunity for all." That is asking for a more highly developed social conscience on the part of the dominant racial group—inevitably White—than has yet been evident.

To make the book fully intelligible, however, a much better map is required. It is not worthy of a good-class publisher to ask readers to struggle with a microscopical map of Africa (1½ inches East to West by 1½ inches North to South)—a map on which Sudan and South Africa are misplaced, and Uganda, the theme-song of the book, is barely legible.

The best summing up of the problem facing Britain in Africa may be found in an extract from Mr. Legum's diary: "It is high time we began to hang on to what we hold," said the General. "Quite so," said the Governor, "but let's be perfectly certain we really hold it before we decide to hang on."

DOUGLAS WHITTON.

ANCIENT FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS IN INDIA,

by K. T. Shah, Bombay, 1954. Pp. 175.

PROFESSOR SHAH'S book is firstly a reminder that India's cultural heritage long predates any intimate contact with modern Europe. Although his book is primarily concerned with economics, he outlines a larger picture of social and political organisation in ancient India which is fascinating as well as enlightening.

A second feature of major interest is the extent to which the ancient Indian economy was, according to Professor Shah, controlled by government. An economy that was socialist by any standards persisted, not for a generation or two, but for centuries. The private enterprise economy introduced under British rule was a passing interlude.

"The Varna-Ashrama-Dharma of ancient Indian polity and economics is a long-range, or permanent plan embracing every class in the entire society. It applied to every individual, in his several conditions of age, work, or situation. No one could be workless. None could have work inappropriate to his ability, training, aptitude, or attainment; nor could any work be inadequately remunerated. The young and the aged would be cared for, provided with such work as they may be able to do, or even without any direct material contribution to the wealth of the community. As will be shown in the succeeding lectures, by specific authority of the Artha Shastra, and other analogous Treatises, the scheme of life practised in India 2,000 years ago and more, and surviving until quite recent times, showed an example of comprehensive coordinated planning which has yet to be correspondingly conceived or similarly attained in any part of the world."

These socialist traditions are likely to have their effect, especially in these comparatively early years of independence, when nationalism and tradition are powerful forces, when the trend towards a socialist state is widespread, and when India's many economic problems make some measure of government economic planning essential.

As well as this socialism, a strong nationalism pervades the book. Sometimes the author only just succeeds in rejecting a temptation to excessive national glorification; but, on the whole, the balance in this emotional matter of handing out national credits is well kept.

In substance, Professor Shah seeks to present the economic organisation of ancient India in modern terms and to show, in effect, that the organisation of ancient India was superior, in both principle and practice, to that of to-day. He seeks "not only to dispel the common misapprehension that economics is a modern science of comparatively recent growth and alien graft; but also to show how profound, how suggestive, how closely akin to modern ideas on the subject, were the economic ideals and objectives of Indian savants of thousands of years ago; how appropriate and effective the solutions they advised." Sometimes the tendency is to force ancient organisation to fit the modern pattern. For example, the common use of currency and credit often referred to almost certainly is only remotely akin to the unceasing use of these instruments by the ordinary individual in highly developed modern economies.

Although Professor Shah uses varied sources, he leans heavily on one ancient source—the *Artha Shastra* of Kautilya. The *Artha Shastra* is a treatise of 15 books, written about the fourth century B.C. Kautilya was "a well-known personage of recorded history, a sage and a scholar, a Minister who was once a recluse, and who, when his self-imposed task was ended, went once more into retirement." Apart from this indigenous material, Professor Shah uses material provided by a "number of unbiased foreign students, visitors, or observers—Greek, Chinese, Arab, and others." He often, and quite properly, finds grounds for contesting points with his foreign authorities.

Economic organisation was as complex in Kautilya's day as now. Agriculture had an important place, but so did the skilled industries (fine textiles, metalwork, etc.), international trade, and public enterprise with its carefully planned fiscal system. The administrative staff "worked a fairly wide, efficient, economic and productive system of taxation, state dues, fees, tolls, produce of public domain or the profits of public enterprise. The place of nature—in the shape of land, water, forest or mineral wealth—as a factor in primary production, and of man's labour, his organising genius or administrative skill, was well understood; and so, too, the return due to these from the aggregate produce or the national dividend."

Kautilya related economics closely to ethics and politics. Material wealth is a means to a full life. Agriculture (with animal husbandry) was the first sector of production, with trade next. A man's place in society was determined by his occupation; but he was not unalterably destined for a certain place in society. Those who served were on society's bottom rung, except only for beggars, but those who served a King devoted to his duty might be included among the highest.

The place of women was defined. "The true place of Woman in the web of Indian life is impossible to understand by those dominated and influenced by ideals of personal freedom, even when they lead, for the male worker, to the wage-slavery of the Victorian era, and for the woman worker, to Mrs. Warren's profession." The *Anushashan Parva* laid down that "always should women be adored and petted; for where women are worshipped there the gods delight." Women had property rights and rights of remarriage when widowed or divorced; and, "if a husband either is of bad character, or is long gone abroad, or has become a traitor to his King, or is likely to endanger the life of his wife, or has fallen from his caste, or has lost virility, he may be abandoned by his wife." Prostitution was carefully regulated. In an interesting aside, Professor Shah notes that "as late as the time of the Vijayanagar Empire, the revenue derived from this source was enough to maintain the entire Police-force of that enormous city."

If all women had rights, errant women risked severe penalties: "She who, having received wages, does not turn out the work, shall have her thumb cut off."

Many Indian skills were already well developed more than 2,000 years ago. For example, "Indian steel is mentioned as the best of its kind for weapons by the ancient Greek Historian Herodotus," and "the extreme fineness of the products of the Indian loom has been noted by the earliest of the foreign travellers." The Indian economy

seems therefore to have been sufficiently specialist to have been necessarily to some extent an exchange economy.

Not surprisingly therefore, Professor Shah describes a highly developed Indian trade with the outside world. Furthermore, the assumption is not correct that "the Phoenicians were the sole masters of the eastern sea, and its only navigators": "there are passages in the Bible distinctly referring to the Indo-Babylonian trade in the Mosaic period (1491-1450 B.C.), and much more frequently in the age of Solomon (1015 B.C.)." Professor Shah resists the temptation to advance "from such evidence the perfectly agreeable hypothesis that the circumnavigation of the world was first accomplished by Indian navigators, including the discovery of the North Pole."

In Kautilya's time, currency circulated widely, there was "a fully developed credit system," and "the importance of a proper regulation of Public Finance, the keystone of the arch of national economy, was fully recognised by the ancient Economists."

Government had a significant economic role. There was an extensive system of social services, a strict and detailed labour code, a Superintendent of Ships, of Commerce, of Agriculture, and of Forest Produce, a government-controlled coinage and a well-developed taxation system, and, finally, direct government production from forests and mines. On the last, Professor Shah says that "judging from the ample instructions given by Kautilya, in a variety of chapters in his great work, the economists of those days must have realised the essential advantage of the profits from public domain and State enterprise, as the abundant and reliable source of public income, as against the compulsory contribution from private wealth we call taxes nowadays." However, when taxes were used, Professor Shah suggests (forcefully but not very attractively) that they were "levied like milking a cow, not wrenching out the nipples."

If the public service required for all this was large, it was also well controlled. "A system of fines for defaults or worse offences and of rewards for special merit in the discharge of these duties helped to make the system more effective. The rewards as well as punishments fell as much upon the mere clerks, as upon the superior officers, inspectors, directors, or even the Auditor-General. The attempt to correlate reward to the work done, or, conversely, punishment to the fault incurred, is a peculiarity of the Indian economic and financial system which receives emphasis in every treatise."

The book has some weaknesses. For example, social services are designed to protect the frailer sections of the population; but is it acceptable to go further and strenuously advocate survival of the weakest as a sound economic precept? Professor Shah says that the "Indian Classical Economists . . . would not accept the purpose of life to be incessant struggle for the survival of the fittest, in terms of the physical force or material goods, and emphasised the obligation of civilised society to ensure an equal chance at least for the survival of the weakest." Perhaps Professor Shah meant something less than that the firm or the producer should be allowed to survive as such: we could readily agree to the survival of individuals.

The author has a hearty dislike and distrust of capitalism. For example, "competition, or freedom of individual enterprise, actuated by the profit motive . . . makes a mincemeat of co-operation, the only true basis of human activity." This attitude is often in the background when he contrasts "production for use" with "production for exchange" or when he hints that capitalist merchants have sometimes been guilty of "preying on one's fellows or securing undue advantage by unjust means for oneself."

Finally, the book is not easy to read, despite the intrinsic interest of the subject. A great deal of space is devoted to describing sources and reaching laboriously towards well-documented conclusions. The book comprises three lectures delivered originally to people who probably had a good background of the lecturer's subject. This background is unlikely to be shared by the average reader, especially outside India. Therefore the usually casual reader will not get the best out of this book unless he changes his spot after the first page or two to become, for the time being at least, the determinedly attentive student.

—C. W. JAMES

THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA, by W. W. Rostow, in collaboration with Richard W. Hatch, Frank A. Kiernan, jun., and Alexander Eckstein. Technology Press and John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1955. Pp. xx plus 379. \$5.00.

THIS book is the second of its type produced by Professor Rostow for the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (The previous work was "The Dynamics of Soviet Power," W. W. Norton, New York, 1953.) The technique used has been to employ an author of great general competence but without specialised expert knowledge: Mr. Rostow is Professor of Economic History and best known for his studies of the 19th century British economy. The author writes on the basis of information obtained from people who are experts in the field and, in the present work, some sections are written by the collaborating authors.

The book sets itself the task of answering the following questions:

- "1. What are the operative motivations of the Chinese Communist regime?
- "2. What are its current intentions with respect to the society of the mainland and to the external world?
- "3. What problems does it confront in achieving its purpose?
- "4. What is the likelihood of Chinese Communist success or failure, in terms of the regime's apparent objectives?
- "5. What are the prospects for change in Chinese Communist society over the foreseeable future?" (Page V.)

The result is a work which has collected a great deal of information about recent developments in China and which had sections of very interesting analysis. The five questions are answered as definitely as the limited evidence allows, perhaps more definitely. All the same, one cannot help feeling that there is something missing, that things are not as simple as the book makes them appear.

The reviewer reflected for some time over the reason for this feeling of dissatisfaction and finally concluded that it was produced by the author's failure to understand the quasi-religious side of Communism. The book is written in terms of what has become the orthodox American theory, that Communism is a conspiracy for power and little else. It is quite true that a great deal of Communist behaviour can be explained in terms of this theory. The mistake is trying to use a theory which explains a great deal as if it explained everything. Action from mixed motives is a normal feature of human behaviour, and it is inherently unlikely that Communists should be exceptional in this. One can find a similar weakness in most Marxist books on history or current affairs. There is a good deal to be said for the Marxist analysis as a partial explanation of human behaviour; all kinds of implausibilities appear when it is used to explain everything.

To give one illustration for a period when the reviewer had some direct knowledge. Chinese Communist motivation in the period between V-J Day and the breakdown of the Marshall mediation is discussed entirely in terms of calculations about the possibility of seizing power. (Pages 32-35.) No allowance is made for the obvious and simple motive of self-preservation. Between 1927 and 1937 the Kuomintang authorities had killed or imprisoned any Communists they could catch. After the interlude of an effective united front between 1937 and 1939 there were increasingly clear indications of a return to a similar policy, except towards people like Chou En-lai's staff in Chungking who had a quasi-diplomatic status. It was quite natural for any Communist in 1945-6 to be very reluctant to give up the security provided by a Party army except in return for the most definite guarantees that his life and liberty would be secure without it. Such guarantees were never given and the experience of the Democratic League showed that opposition parties without a private army to protect them could not hope for security under Kuomintang rule. Calculations about seizing power may always have been an important part of Communist motivation but, for this period at least, they were obviously not the sole motivation.

The general effect of this theoretical assumption is to produce an account which is unnaturally tidy and from which the sense of tragedy has disappeared. In fact, most revolutions are both untidy and tragic. Revolutionaries are usually fanatics, motivated by some faith and by some vision of the future. Because this faith is usually unrealistic and the vision of the future unattainable, they find themselves in a situation of frustration where their hopes are disappointed. In the end they may settle down to the completely cynical pursuit of power for the sake of a cause they no longer really believe in. But this is likely to be the final result of a series of decisions each of which seemed to be regrettable but unavoidable at the time when it was taken. And there may well be personal tragedies as well as the social tragedy. Most of the original Bolshevik leaders were finally humiliated and executed by the very organisation to which they had devoted their lives.

There are occasional passages in which Professor Rostow admits that the Chinese Communist leaders may really have believed in Communism. For example, "There is, nevertheless, some tendency in the early days of Chinese Communist policy to identify actions that would result in revolutionary political and social change with those required to increase agricultural and industrial output; the regime repeated certain aspects of Soviet policy that had failed and had been substantially abandoned at least fifteen years before its initial effort was undertaken." (Pages 90-1.) Even this leaves out the emotionally charged form in which this "tendency" would have expressed itself. What the Communist leaders would probably have said, and largely believed, would be something like, "Freed from the fetters of feudalism, capitalism and imperialism, the productive forces of the Chinese workers and peasants will develop new potentialities." Though they would not have said openly, "Chinese can succeed where the Russians failed," they may well have believed it.

For the most part, however, Professor Rostow considers that any genuine desire to serve the Chinese people is exceptional among the higher ranks of the Chinese Communist Party. "Having gained power by mobilising a political base in the countryside for its armies, the Communists now aim to wring from the peasantry the resources necessary for the first Five Year Plan, perhaps at the cost of widespread starvation, certainly at the cost of denying the peasant effective title to his land and to any substantial measure of material progress. One can assume that this policy is acceptable to most hardened top Communist Party members. It is not to be ruled out, however, that some will feel that the regime's austere collectivisation policy is wrong . . . they may, in some obscure human way, regard it as wrong to betray the hopes and aspirations on which Chinese Communism was largely built." (Pages 129-30.) More often ideals are only allowed to the lower ranks of the Party. "Further down the line, in and out of the Communist Party, they had stirred hopes for a humanistic future in China quite different from that which has emerged; but to the top leadership such hopes were the product of a 'bourgeois immaturity' which they might exploit but for which they felt no responsibility." (Page 166.)

The result is that Chinese Communist policy appears as the result of cool and cold-hearted calculation by completely cynical leaders immune to most human feelings. There is no consideration of the alternative hypothesis that the Chinese Communist leaders are normal human beings exhibiting symptoms that often accompany infection with fanaticism. If they believe in the infallibility of the Communist Party they will naturally consider it essential for the Communist Party to remain in power. If they believe that they know with absolute certainty the only course of development which can save the Chinese people, they may be genuinely devoted to what they believe to be the interests of the Chinese people and yet be ready to inflict suffering on large sections of the Chinese people in the spirit of a doctor who undertakes painful treatment for his patient's good. There is a very wide overlap between the actions implied by this sort of fanaticism and those implied by a cynical pursuit of power, so that it is hard to give conclusive evidence for either theory of motivation. However, in the reviewer's opinion, a motivation in which fanaticism plays a large part gives the best explanation of Chinese Communist policy.

The account of actual developments since 1949 is only slightly distorted by this theory of Communist motivation. The book gives a clear summary of the main changes in policy and their results. A good deal of evidence is given to support the

view that the regime has now less popular support than at the first period of its power. It is admitted that "for some, idealism may still burn bright despite disappointments, notably if they are engaged personally in constructive enterprise where positive results can be observed," (page 167) and, in the reviewer's opinion, enough weight is not given to this factor. At least for educated Chinese opinion, the unpleasant aspects of the regime are counterbalanced by pride in its great accomplishments as compared with any previous regime in technical non-political fields, and in the fact that China has now really become a Great Power in international affairs.

One of the most interesting parts of the book is the discussion of the prospects for economic development. China started its plans for industrialisation from a level comparable to that of Russia in 1913 and from a general situation much less favourable than that of Russia in 1928. The Gross National Product per head was only one quarter of the figure for Russia in 1928, the density of agricultural population over nine times as great with much less unused fertile land, the railway system was less developed, mineral resources were smaller, and so on. This means that the margin for error is much smaller. The conclusion drawn is that agriculture is the key sector of the economy especially because it will have to provide the main exports to finance the import of capital equipment. If agriculture can make full use of the technical possibilities and the limited investment allotted to it, it seems that the Five Year Plan started in 1952 can be realised and would bring the Chinese economy to a level comparable to that of Russia in 1928. If agricultural output does not rise it is argued that the industrialisation policy can only be carried out at the expense of widespread starvation in the countryside.

A model is drawn up of possible growth up to 1962, which shows the possibility of a more than threefold increase in industrial output over 10 years and a rise of over 50% in urban personal consumption, but only a very small rise in rural living standards. This is, however, based on the assumption that the population will only rise to 654 million while Chinese official estimates give a figure of 700 million for 1962. And even on Professor Rostow's assumption, the rural population rises in spite of a rapid transfer to the cities.

The figures given show that the population problem is the limiting factor in the ability of the regime to make any permanent improvement in the condition of the Chinese people. This point is perhaps not made as clear as it deserves to be because the author assumes that the Chinese Communist leadership is not really interested in the condition of the people and will not mind famine conditions in the countryside so long as this does not lead to rebellion; though it is argued that sufficiently serious food shortage might produce a change in foreign policy attempting to conquer the food-surplus areas of South-East Asia. On the other hand, if it is allowed that the Chinese Communist leadership may at least partly believe what they say about their desire to serve the Chinese people, then their willingness to face the possibility of a population problem will largely determine the future development of China.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

Institute Notes

PUBLICATION OF THE DYASON LECTURES, 1955

It is a pleasure to announce that the Dyason Lectures for 1955, delivered by the Rt. Hon. Mr. Kenneth Younger, M.P., will be published in the December issue of "The Australian Outlook."

Mr. Younger has provided the edited texts of his three public addresses for publication.

This will be the first occasion on which the Dyason Lecture series will have been published, thereby providing a permanent record of the views of the visiting speaker.

VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND

Members of the Australian Institute of International Affairs will also be interested to know that Mr. Younger took the opportunity at the conclusion of his Dyason Lecture tour of visiting New Zealand, and establishing contact with various members of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, particularly in Wellington and Auckland. During his return flight to London, Mr. Younger planned to make a short stop-over visits in Jakarta and Singapore.

